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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to find lessons for Navy business transformation 
efforts to ensure that the planned changes persist.  Over the years many best practices 
have been adopted from private industry.  Some of these provided lasting change, but 
many did not.  The organization and motivation of private industry and the Navy are very 
different and perhaps this led to problems implementing these best practices. 
This thesis analyzed successful financial management transformation at a smaller 
government entity.  The budgetary and financial pressures faced by another government 
entity are more similar to the Navy’s problems than those faced in private industry.  The 
successful transformation was then analyzed through a change persistence model. 
This research found that the Navy has a sound business transformation plan that is 
centered on reengineering processes and systems.  However, the plan needs to be 
supplemented with teaching and socializing interventions to ensure that buy-in is 
achieved across the enterprise. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
The objective of this thesis is to conduct archival research to identify the financial 
management, budgeting and internal control changes that were effected by the 
Corporation for National and Community Service (hereon “The Corporation”) after the 
response to an Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) violation transformed the Corporation into a 
better managed and more respected government agency.  Their actions will be analyzed 
to determine if there are lessons that can be applied to the Department of the Navy’s 
financial management practices. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The Navy has adopted several management reform initiatives from private 
industry.  These initiatives include the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution 
System, Total Quality Management and Lean Six Sigma.  Each of these initiatives has 
met with varying levels of success as they were imposed on the complex structure of the 
Department of Defense.  Similarly, each Secretary of Defense from Forrestal to Rumsfeld 
has introduced reform initiatives; some of these reforms persisted, but many did not.1  It 
may be that because many of these reform agendas originated in private industry, they do 
not generalize to the challenges of defense management.  Congressional pressures, 
complex and sprawling organizational structures, external budget pressures such as 
increasing mandatory spending, the peculiarities of federal appropriation laws, frequent 
leadership turnover and the realities of increased operations due to conflict can derail 
reforms imported from private industry.  By examining the transformational success in 
financial management of another federal agency, some of the challenges faced in 
adopting private industry reforms may be reduced.   
                                                 
1 Daniel Francis and Robin Walther, “A Comparative History of Department of Defense Management 
Reform from 1947 to 2005,” MBA Professional Project, Center for Defense Management Reform, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 2006. 
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For example, the Corporation for National and Community Service faced 
challenges similar to what the Navy faces in financial management, budgeting and 
internal controls.  The Corporation’s 2002 ADA violation was a symptom of more 
widespread financial management problems at the Corporation.  The Navy occasionally 
has ADA violations which can be viewed as a symptom of broader financial management 
problems.  The financial management problems at the Corporation occurred in an 
environment similar to that faced in the Navy: attempts to adopt private-industry best 
practices, congressional pressures and oversight, an organization that is not universally 
loved by outsiders, a management team coordinating an all volunteer force that turns over 
rapidly, and planning for an uncertain financial future.  There are parallels in what led to 
the crisis in the Corporation and the financial management problems that face the Navy 
today: coordination of accounting systems, upgrading legacy IT systems and making 
those systems communicate effectively, complex budgeting systems and uncertain costs, 
rapid leadership turnover, and a lack of measurable performance metrics or metrics that 
do not measure what was intended.   
The research questions are as follows:  
Research Question 1: What were the financial management, budget and internal control 
problems that led to the Corporation’s ADA violation and program disruption? 
Research Question 2: What financial management, budget and internal control changes 
were implemented by the Corporation to correct those problems? 
Research Question 3: What was it about these changes that made them persist? 
Research Question 4: What lessons can be applied to Navy financial management to 
generate similar positive effects? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
There is not a way to create an experiment that examines management change 
within the Department of the Navy, because the process is continuous and the 
Department is too large.  According to Robert Yin, case studies are the preferred strategy 
“when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
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contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.”2  By analyzing the 
experiences of the Corporation during and after the ADA violation there will likely be 
more variables than data points that led to the positive change effected.  As Yin 
describes, a case study can cope with “…a technically distinctive situation where there 
will be more variables of interest than data points.”3  By examining the experiences of the 
Corporation through a framework of management change theory, this thesis will attempt 
to find lessons for the Navy financial management community and its efforts to transform 
for the future.   
To find lessons for the DoD and Navy business transformation efforts this thesis 
utilized the case method.  Many scholars in the hard sciences stereotype the case method 
as weak due to its qualitative nature.  However, the case method is extensively used in the 
social sciences, including the fields of management sciences and public policy.  A case 
study is appropriate for this study because it is designed to answer research questions that 
begin with what, how and why, much like the research questions posed above.  The case 
study also does not require behavioral control of events, and because this thesis was 
conducted using archival research and theory on successful transformation, there was no 
control over those events.  Finally, the case study focuses on contemporary events, and 
many of the change efforts within DoD are continuous and happening now.  Additionally, 
a focus on contemporary events serves another goal of this thesis; to help those charged 
with the change process make those changes persist.   
Why the case method?  “A case study in an empirical inquiry that: investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”4  Analyzing success in 
another government entity may provide valuable lessons for the Navy.  There have been 
many studies of DoD that intended to improve business practices.  Most of these studies 
were aimed at adopting best practices from private industry and applying them to the 
                                                 
2 Robert Yin, Case Study Research, Third Edition, Volume 5, Thousand Oaks, Ca : Sage Publications, 
2004, 7. 
3 Ibid, 13. 
4 Ibid, 13. 
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DoD.  However, many of the best practices from private industry were created using a 
profit driven approach, the Navy does not generate a profit.  Federal fiscal law and the 
complexities of an executive branch agency complicate the change process.  While best 
practices from companies like General Electric and Toyota may provide short-term 
benefits to the Navy, they may not persist due to differences in operating environment. 
Why this case?  While significantly smaller than the DoD and Navy, the 
Corporation for National and Community Service faces similar problems in financial 
management that are found in the Navy.  Both are required to uphold federal fiscal law 
and both consist of an all volunteer force.  Federal entities are required to comply with 
the CFO Act of 1990 and the Government Results and Performance Act of 1994, 
something unique to federal financial management.  This thesis recognizes that the size 
differences may not be scaleable.  However, the process of teaching and socializing a 
change process may be applicable.  Many of the best practices adopted from private 
industry are from organizations much smaller than the Navy and do not have the 
restrictions imposed by federal fiscal law.  By analyzing the change process of an 
organization that is more similar to the Navy than a private corporation, some of the 
barriers to change may be broken down. 
This thesis was generated using archival data gathered from the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), the Corporation’s financial reports, the Corporation’s 
Inspector General, Congressional testimony, previous research conducted on reform 
processes, government documents, Navy documents and media reports.  
The qualitative nature of the data does not lend itself to standard statistical 
analysis.  Instead, the data were analyzed through a change management framework 
called “Time, Temporal Capability, and Planned Change” written by Quy Nguyen Huy.  
Specifically the framework is used to analyze the change processes that were 
implemented by the Corporation to effect change in financial management, budgeting and 
internal controls.  These change processes were implemented over time on a continuum 
of leadership styles.  This framework offers seven propositions regarding planned 
change, such as the change that the Corporation implemented after its 2002 ADA 
violation and the change in financial management that the Navy desires over the next 10 
 5
years.  The framework takes into account the external pressures faced by organizations, 
re-engineering processes, training and socializing change.  This framework is then used 
to analyze the Navy’s business reform efforts and suggested improvements are made 
based on the Corporation’s experience. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II provides a background of the Anti-Deficiency Act and a summary of 
the Navy’s ADA violations in recent history.  Chapter II then reviews previous work on 
Department of Defense change management and change reforms.  Consideration is given 
to past trends and current initiatives in the area of financial management.  The review 
includes Defense-wide business transformation efforts and then looks at specific Navy 
efforts in the area.  Then the thesis examines the perceived success of these initiatives by 
summarizing several GAO reports that deal specifically with financial management and 
business reform.  Finally, Huy’s framework for analyzing change is introduced.   
The narrative experience of the Corporation is presented in Chapter III.  The data 
were drawn from the GAO, financial reports, IG reports, Congressional testimony and 
media reports.  The data are presented as a historical overview of the experiences during 
and after the 2002 ADA violation.  The focus of the narrative is on areas within the 
Corporation that deal with financial management, budgeting and internal controls.  This 
limit on scope was intentional to generate the most salient lessons that can be applied to 
the Navy’s financial management community.   
Chapter IV presents an analysis of the experiences of the Corporation.  
Specifically, the data are analyzed using Huy’s framework to determine how the change 
processes that were implemented to effect change in financial management, budgeting 
and internal controls persisted.  Chapter IV examines the experiences of the Corporation 
after its ADA violation and seeks to understand the changes it made to become a 
respected government agency in the area of financial management.  This chapter 
generates the lessons that can be applied to the Navy financial management community.   
Chapter V presents an analysis of the Navy financial management community and 
its recent attempts to transform business practices.  The cornerstone of the Navy’s 
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transformation plan is Sea Enterprise.  Sea Enterprise is the business enabler for Sea 
Power-21 and guides the financial management community in its efforts to become more 
efficient and effective.  After this analysis the lessons learned from the Corporation are 
applied to the Navy’s efforts to generate the same positive effects.  The analysis includes 
applications to the financial management community, links to Sea Enterprise, links to 
Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan (FIAR), links to the Business 
Transformation Agency (BTA), links to Navy Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and 
links to Navy financial and internal control systems. 
Chapter VI presents findings and recommendations.  This chapter also provides 
recommendations for further consideration. 
E. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS 
In a time of expanding mandatory spending, increased operations and increased 
Congressional scrutiny of Department of Defense financial management, the Department 
of the Navy has a reform agenda to improve the efficiency of financial management 
practices.  Similar external pressures are felt by other federal agencies.  Government 
financial management reform has been at the forefront since passage of the Chief 
Financial Officer Act of 1990, the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and 
the President’s Management Agenda in 2002.  Many of the reforms initiated by the Navy 
have been taken from private industry and several of them have not met expectations.  
The size and complexity of the Navy limit change processes that may have worked at a 
smaller private organization.  There are lessons that can be applied to the Navy by 
analyzing another government agency that faces internal and external pressures similar to 
those that the Navy faces.   
By analyzing an agency that has successfully recovered from the same types of 
problems that challenge Navy financial managers, a roadmap for future success could be 
generated.  The parallels that exist between the problems with the Corporation’s financial 
management and the Navy make this a rich case by analogy.  Just as the Corporation 
started from a position of weakness, the financial management of the Navy, even its plan 
to reform its financial management system has been labeled as weak by GAO, this is 
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persistent across DoD.5  The Corporation overcame its weakness in a period of five 
years; determining how this was accomplished can valuable as the Navy moves forward.  
This work will provide a reference for financial management reform for future reform 
planning and implementation. 
This thesis has several limitations.  By analyzing the experiences of only one 
other government agency, there exists the possibility that the changes made in the 
Corporation were a singular event and cannot be applied to other agencies.  The 
Corporation is also smaller than the Navy and its reforms may not scale easily.  Another 
limitation is that the data were collected from archival sources available in the public 
domain, and within those archival sources, there are references to internal Corporation 
documents that were not available for study.  These documents may contain key facts 
regarding the change implementation; therefore assumptions on some of the processes 
were made by inference.  However, there are many more similarities to the financial 
management problems faced by the Corporation and the Navy than there are differences. 
                                                 
5 Government Accountability Office, “Further Actions are Needed to Effectively Address Business 
Management Problems and Overcome Key Business Transformation Challenges,” GAO-05-140T, 
available from www.gao.gov.  Accessed November 16, 2007. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This literature review is presented in five sections.  The first discusses how ADA 
violations, as a symptom for underlying financial management and internal control 
weaknesses, negatively impact the Navy’s ability to meet its transformation goals.  The 
second section focuses on Defense-wide business transformation initiatives.  The third 
section outlines the Navy’s general reform agenda.  The fourth section provides a 
synopsis of GAO reports that have studied the progress and success of DoD business 
transformation plans.  The final section is devoted to how organizations effect positive 
transformational change.   
B. THE ANTI-DEFICIENCY ACT 
The Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) is encapsulated in Title 31 U.S.C. § 1341, 1342 
and 1517.  The Act is one of the most powerful tools that Congress uses to regulate its 
constitutional power of the purse.  Section 1341 (a) (1) (A) prohibits making or 
authorizing an expenditure from, or creating or authorizing an obligation under, any 
appropriation or fund in excess of the amount available in the appropriation or fund 
unless authorized by law.6  Section 1341 (a) (1) (B) prohibits involving the government 
in any obligation to pay money before funds have been appropriated for that purpose, 
unless otherwise allowed by law.7  Section 1342 prohibits accepting voluntary services 
for the United States, or employing personal services not authorized by law, except in 
cases of emergency involving the safety of human life or the protection of property.8  
Section 1517 (a) prohibits making obligations or expenditures in excess of an 
apportionment or reapportionment, or in excess of the amount permitted by agency 
regulations.9  
                                                 





Violations of the ADA are subject to both fiscal and penal sanctions.10  The ADA 
is the only one of the Title 31 U.S.C. fiscal statutes that prescribes both types of 
penalties.11  When an agency determines that it has violated the Act it must immediately 
report the violation to the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House 
and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.  This report includes the facts 
related to the violation and actions taken to remedy the violation.  When needed, the 
agency must also request a supplemental appropriation to cover the deficiency.   
In 2005, GAO created a repository for all ADA violation reports.  Records are 
available for fiscal years 2005 and 2006.  In that time, the Department of the Navy 
incurred 10 violations of the ADA.  In fiscal year 2005, the Navy had six violations of 
ranging from $79,419.00 to $21,800,000.00.  In fiscal year 2006 the Navy had four ADA 
violations ranging from $67,000.00 to $561,906.87.  These violations came from several 
different appropriations including Operations and Maintenance, Navy; Navy Defense 
Working Capital Fund; Military Personnel, Marine Corps; and Research, Development, 
Test and Evaluation, Navy.  For fiscal years 2005 and 2006 the DoD accounted for 77 
percent of all ADA violations. 
ADA violations erode Congress’ confidence in the financial management of the 
Department.  History has shown that ADA violations can lead to Congressional 
rescissions, increased oversight, increased audits, reduced readiness and reduced 
budgetary flexibility.  Although ADA violations are a mere symptom, they are a good 
proxy for determining the financial management health of a government entity when 
other factors such as auditability and congressionally mandated GAO reports are taken 
into account.   
C. DOD MANAGEMENT REFORMS 
Francis and Walther found that management reform has been almost continuous 
within the DoD for the past six decades.  Management reform has led to exhaustive 
                                                 
10 Government Accountability Office, “Antideficency Act Background,” available from 
www.gao.goc/ada/antideficiency.htm, accessed August 3, 2007. 
11 Ibid. 
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efforts and nearly continuous debate on these efforts for that same timeframe.12  
Proponents contend that the benefits of reform outweigh the costs.  Opponents feel that 
the change is marginal at best and efforts do not transition between administrations, 
wasting precious time and money that could be spent on operations.  Their findings also 
suggest that future reforms will be new versions of the same marginal change that has 
been ongoing since 1947, but contain the management terminology currently in favor.13   
The initiatives studied by Francis and Walther covered all aspects of management reform. 
Financial management reform, as a subset of overall reform, has been an issue at the 
forefront in more recent history.   
Financial management, budget and accounting reform have been particularly 
noteworthy in the DoD for the past two decades.  The Chief Financial Officers Act (CFO 
Act) of 1990 placed significant pressure on all federal agencies to achieve unqualified 
audits of their financial statements.  Since then, DoD is one of a handful of federal 
entities that has not achieved a clean audit opinion.  In 1993, Congress passed the 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA); GPRA has been the driving force 
behind performance based management reform.  The current era business transformation 
efforts can be directly tied to the CFO Act, GPRA and several Presidential initiatives.   
In the current era, the Defense Transformation Act for the 21st Century (DTA) 
was the Bush administration and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s vision for the 
transformation of the Department’s management, financial management and budgeting 
processes.  However, only portions of the DTA were passed by Congress in the Defense 
Authorization Act of 2003.  Congress felt that sections of the DTA gave DoD too much 
discretionary power and therefore limited the scope of the Act.14  In a brief to the House 
Government Reform Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, 
acknowledged that by 2003 the DoD was reducing management and headquarters staff by 
11 percent and that a new financial management system was being implemented to 
                                                 
12 Francis and Walther,  2006. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Jerry McCaffery and L.R. Jones, Budgeting and Financial Management for National Defense, 
Information Age Publishing: Greenwich, CT, 2004. 
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integrate all DoD financial systems into a single system.15  Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz 
then added that internal changes alone would not provide the sweeping changes that DoD 
required to transform its business practices, it needed legislative relief.  The DoD also 
needed a vehicle to implement the changes directed by DTA; and this vehicle would 
evolve into the Business Transformation Agency (BTA). 
In July 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld signed a memorandum establishing the 
Financial Management Modernization Program (FMMP).  The FMMP became the 
Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) in May 2003 by a memorandum 
signed by the Under Secretary for Defense (Comptroller); this shift reflected the 
Department’s focus on changing business processes not just financial practices.  In 
October 2005, the Under Secretary for Defense ((Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) 
USD AT&L) signed a memorandum establishing the BTA, the BTA replaced BMMP. 
According to the BTA’s website, the agency was established to “enhance support 
of the warfighter and provide better financial accountability to the American people.”16  
The BTA is a separate DoD entity that reports directly to the USD (AT&L).  The goals of 
the BTA are to provide accountability to the taxpayer by methodically improving the 
DoD’s business processes, systems and investment governance.  To achieve these goals, 
the BTA produced the Enterprise Transition Plan (ETP), “an integrated and executable 
roadmap aligned to the Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA).  The ETP and BEA 
enable the Department to transform business operations to achieve improved warfighter 
support while enabling financial accountability across the Department of Defense.”17   
The Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC) oversees DoD-wide 
enterprise transformation efforts.  The relationships between the BTA, DBSMC, Office 
of the Secretary of Defense Staff and the services can be seen in Figure 1 below. 
                                                 
15 McCaffery and Jones, 2004. 
16 Business Transformation Agency, “FAQs—The BTA,” available from www.dod.mil/bta, accessed 




Figure 1.   Enterprise-Level Transformation Governance (From DoD September 2007 
ETP) 
The BTA encourages collaboration across the services to take advantage of 
centralized visibility of investments in enterprise-wide business transformation efforts.  
The BTA recognizes that this is not the first business transformation initiative in DoD, 
but contends that the BTA is different in that it recognizes that sweeping, immediate 
changes cannot be made in an organization as complex as DoD.  The BTA intends to 
focus on a clear set of priorities driven by customer needs; these priorities will then be 
driven from the top.  One of the early business transformation goals was to achieve an 
unqualified audit opinion on DoD’s financial statement by 2007, as it became clear that 
this goal was unattainable the DoD created the Financial Improvement and Audit 
Readiness (FIAR) Plan. 
In December 2005, the DoD published the FIAR Plan, the vision for improving 
financial management.  A report on the progress of the FIAR Plan is submitted to the 
Office of Management and Budget and Congress two times per year.  According to the 
USD ((Comptroller) USD (C)), “Improvement efforts proceed along two tracks: 1) those 
that improve the accuracy, timeliness, and availability of financial information; and 2) 
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those that help the Department achieve audit readiness.”18  The USD (C) recognizes that 
in order to achieve financial management transformation, the FIAR Plan must be 
integrated with other transformation efforts.  In order to meet several goals of the FIAR 
Plan, goals of the ETP must be met first.  Therefore, the Department’s Financial 
Improvement Plans (FIP) have been integrated into the ETP.  In cases where financial 
management improvements depend on success of ETP initiatives, milestones from ETP 
are interlinked and specified within the milestones laid out in the FIP.  The FIAR Plan 
also incorporates the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directives on internal 
controls contained in OMB circular A-123.  Specified internal control activities are 
embedded in milestones in the FIAR Plan and the FIPs.19 
To date, only seven of nineteen defense reporting entities have achieved a clean 
audit opinion, but progress has been made; a few years ago only two were unqualified.20 
The release of the 2006 FIAR Plan pushed the goal of department-wide clean financial 
statements to the year 2017.  In July 2007, the USD (C) issued a memorandum revising 
the audit readiness strategy.  The revised strategy recognizes the enterprise-wide, 
horizontal elements of the financial environment; identifies audit readiness segments for 
the military services and components; and revised business rules to sustain incremental 
financial improvement while limiting audit engagements to those that only cover full 
financial statement audits.21     
As a component of DoD, the Navy also recognized that business practice reform 
was needed to be successful in the future.  Its plan, Sea Power-21, is consistent with the 
goals of the DTA, the FMMP, BMMP, FIAR and BTA.  Sea Power-21 is the Navy’s 
                                                 
18 Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “Update on Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness 
Activities,” Memorandum, July 13, 2007, 1. 
19 Department of Defense, “Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan,” Spetember 30, 2006.  
Available from http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/FIAR/documents/FIAR_Plan_Sept_2006.pdf, 
accessed September 25, 2007.   
20 Ibid.
       21  Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “Update on Financial Improvement and Audit 
Readiness Activities,” Memorandum, July 13, 2007, 6.  
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overarching transformation effort designed to meet future threats; Sea Enterprise 
is the business enabler for Sea Power-21.   
D. NAVY BUSINESS REFORM INITIATIVES 
Admiral Vern Clark published an article titled “Sea Power-21: Projecting 
Decisive Joint Capabilities,” in the October 2002 issue of Proceedings.  In this article, 
Admiral Clark described Sea Power-21 as the Navy’s vision to “align, organize, 
integrate, and transform our Navy to meet the challenges that lie ahead.”22  Sea Power-21 
is built around Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea Basing.  Sea Strike expands power 
projection by incorporating networked sensors, combat systems and sailors to enhance 
the offensive power of naval forces.  Sea Shield is based on the idea of global defensive 
assurance and access to the littorals.  Sea Basing provides support to the joint force by 
employing mobile and secure sovereign platforms operating from the sea.23 
The vision of Sea Power-21 cannot be met using current management and 
financial policies.  According to the BTA, the Navy risks becoming undersized due to 
frequent shifts of funds intended for recapitalization into operational accounts.  The 
average age of Navy ships and aircraft continue to rise.  Surface combatants have an 
average age of 15.2 years, submarines 16.5 years, logistics ships 20.5 years and aircraft 
15.4 years.24  
According to Admiral Clark, Sea Enterprise is the key to finding and allocating 
resources to recapitalize the Navy.25  The goals of Sea Enterprise are to improve 
organizational alignment, refine requirements and reinvest savings to recapitalize the 
fleet.  By leveraging lessons from the business revolution, Sea Enterprise hopes to 
“reduce overhead, streamline processes, substitute technology for manpower, and create 
                                                 
22 Admiral Vern Clark, “Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,” Proceedings, October 
2002.  Available from www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/proceedings.html, accessed September 18, 2007. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Business Transformation Agency, “Case in Point: Sea Enterprise,” available from 
www.defenselink.mil/dbt/cip_sea-enterprise.html, accessed September 18, 2007. 
25 Clark, 12. 
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incentives for positive change.”26  The Navy has targeted cost reductions similar to 
industry standards of five to ten percent.27  To meet this goal, the BTA lists eight areas 
that the Navy must improve: “leverage technology to improve performance and minimize 
manpower costs; promote competition and reward innovation and efficiency; challenge 
barriers to innovation; divest non-core, under-performing, or unnecessary products, 
services, and production capacity, especially ashore; merge redundant efforts to become 
lean and agile; minimize acquisition and lifecycle costs; maximize in-service capital 
equipment use; and challenge every assumption, cost, and requirement.”28 
E. BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION PROGRESS 
GAO has reported that DoD faces many problems relating to business operations.  
DoD has been designated as high-risk in eight areas: approach to business transformation, 
personnel security clearance program, support infrastructure management, business 
systems modernization, financial management, weapon systems acquisition, contract 
management and supply chain management.  Along with six government-wide high-risk 
areas, DoD is responsible for 14 of 25 high-risk areas.  Only three are germane to this 
thesis: approach to transformation (designated in 2005), business system modernization 
(designated in 1995) and financial management (designated in 1995).29   
GAO has also reported that “DOD’s pervasive financial and business 
management problems adversely affect the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of its 
operations…and left it vulnerable to billions of dollars of fraud, waste, and abuse 
annually, at a time of increasing fiscal constraint.”30  GAO notes that DoD spends 
billions of dollars annually to operate, maintain and modernize its business systems, yet 
GAO continues to find numerous systems that are behind schedule and that do not meet 
                                                 
26 Clark, 2002. 
27 BTA, “Case in Point: Sea Enterprise,” 1. 
28 Ibid, 1. 
29 Government Accountability Office, “Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform DOD 
Business Operations,” GAO-05-629T, available from www.gao.gov, accessed September 01, 2007. 
30 Government Accountability Office, “Sustained Leadership is Critical to Effective Financial and 
Business Management Transformation,” GAO-06-1006T, available from www.gao.gov, accessed 
September 01, 2007. 
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the promised capability.31  To overcome these problems GAO recommended that the 
DoD develop and implement a comprehensive business transformation plan and create 
the position of Chief Management Officer (CMO) within the DoD.  DoD has resisted 
creating the position of CMO, instead focusing transformation efforts on BTA and the 
FIAR Plan.  In September 2007, the Secretary of Defense designated the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense as CMO.  It is not yet clear whether this designation will involve 
positive change because the Deputy Secretary of Defense has numerous other priorities 
that may eclipse his role as CMO. 
GAO recognizes the positive steps taken by DoD in the creation of the BTA, but 
notes that the BTA appears to be overly focused on business system modernization, 
limiting the scope of the transformation.  GAO notes that efforts in the areas of planning, 
management, structures and processes related to all business areas need investigation.32  
In November 2006, GAO noted that DoD has made progress in transforming its business 
operations, but that a comprehensive, enterprise-wide approach to its transformation was 
lacking.33  The BTA has since established several core business transformation elements 
that it feels are required for success.  These elements can be seen in the figure below.   
                                                 
31 GAO-06-1006T. 
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GAO-06-234T, available from www.gao.gov, accessed September 01, 2007. 
33 Government Accountability Office, “A Comprehensive Plan, Integrated Leadership, and Sustained 




Figure 2.   Core Business Transformation Elements (From DoD September 2007 ETP) 
Both DoD and the DON recognize that financial management reform is needed 
and GAO has found that the approach to reform is not meeting current goals.  By 
analyzing a successful reform in another government entity through an academic change 
persistence model there may be lessons that can be applied to DoD and DON change 
agendas. 
F. CHANGE PERSISTENCE MODEL 
Business transformation is about organizational change.  There has been much 
research in the area of planned organizational change.  To analyze the success of planned 
change this thesis uses a change framework proposed by Quy Nguyen Huy in an article 
titled “Time, Temporal Capability, and Planned Change.”  This framework defines four 
ideal types of change intervention: commanding intervention, engineering intervention, 
teaching intervention and socializing intervention.34  This model was chosen because it 
incorporates both the content of the change and the sequencing of the planned change 
itself.  The model recognizes that large scale change in complex organizations can only 
be made when many elements are altered and that different methods of achieving specific 
change must be used to generate change across complex organizations.  This requires the 
                                                 
34 Quy Nguyen Huy, “Time, Temporal Capability, and Planned Change,” Academy of Management.  
The Academy of Management Review, October 2001; 26, 4. 
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change agent to sequence the incremental changes temporally and apply the correct 
intervention type to each planned change.35  Several other authors have used Huy’s 
model in describing change.  This model has been applied to widely varying topics such 
as: frameworks for selecting change strategies36, research on innovation in 
organizations37, eGovernment and structural reform38, the pace, sequence, and linearity 
of radical change39, and the rhythm of change40.   
There have been several articles published that deal specifically with 
transformation and change.  Many of these articles pose theories that attempt to quantify 
a process that is more qualitative in nature.  Many of these articles propose a laundry list 
of activities that management must do in order to achieve the desired results, whether 
those results be increased sales, streamlined processes, or reduced costs.  There are 
several studies that show how businesses and government can benefit from process 
improvements generated from Lean Six Sigma projects.  Yet, each falls short of 
providing a model to describe change in a large organization that operates within the 
confines of federal financial management.   
In 1995, John P. Kotter published an article describing why transformation efforts 
fail.  He proposes eight steps that must be taken to establish lasting change and notes that 
skipping any one step only creates the illusion of speeding up the process.41  The eight 
steps include: establishing a sense of urgency; forming a powerful guiding coalition; 
                                                 
35 Huy, 2001. 
36 Pries-Heje and Vinter, “A Framework for Selecting Change Strategies in IT Organizations,” Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science 4034, 2006. 
37 Damanpour and Wischnevsky, “Research on Innovation in Organizations: Distinguishing 
Innovation-Generating from Innovation-Adopting Organizations,” Journal of Engineering and Technology 
Management, 23 (4), December 2006. 
38 Pries-Heje, “eGovernment and Structural Reform on Bornholm: A Case Study,” Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science 3591, 2005. 
39 Amis, Slack, and Hinings, “The Pace, Sequence, and Linearity of Radical Change,” Academy of 
Management Journal, 47 (1), February 2004. 
40 Huy and Mintzberg, “The Rhythm of Change,” MIT Sloan Management Review, 44 (4), Summer 
2003. 
41 John P. Kotter, “Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail,” Harvard Business Review, 
January 2007, Vol. 85 Issue 1, p. 96-103.  Available  from 
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=1&hid=14&sid=f5d05dd9-f6f5-4367-9f55-
a32814a15ba2%40SRCSM2, accessed September 25, 2007. 
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creating a vision; communicating the vision; empowering others to act on the vision; 
planning for and creating short-term wins; consolidating improvements and producing 
still more change; and institutionalizing new approaches.42  This theory was not used in 
this thesis for two reasons.  There is no mention of how the external environment affects 
change and several of the changes underway in DoD and the Navy already contain many, 
if not all, of the steps listed in Kotter’s model.  If GAO contends that the business 
transformation of DoD and the Navy are not making acceptable progress, a new change 
model may provide a better fit.    
Huy’s model focuses on two constructs in planned change that he felt were under 
explored.  These include time and the content of change.43  Time can be broken down 
into two distinct types, quantitative and qualitative.  Quantitative time is clock time and 
lends itself to precise measurement.  Proponents of quantitative time see time as a scarce 
commodity, time is money.44  Qualitative time is dependent on the subject and can have 
many different meanings to different people.  Qualitative time cannot be measured easily 
and proponents of qualitative time view time as private and emotional.  According to 
Huy, recognizing qualitative time is important in the change process because different 
people view time differently and this can become a source of stress.45  In presenting his 
model, Huy first defines the ideal intervention types as commanding intervention, 
engineering intervention, teaching intervention and socializing intervention.  He then 
explains the efforts of large scale change as altering many elements within an 
organization and using multiple intervention types to create lasting change.  Finally he 
proposes a “synthesis of interventions via the concept of temporal capability, involving 
sequencing and combining the ideal types.”46   
A commanding intervention tends to be directive and authoritative.  The 
leadership comes from a small group of powerful people or powerful groups.  According 
                                                 
42 Kotter, 2007. 
43 Huy, 2001. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid, 604. 
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to Huy, the commanding intervention is likely to be effective in an organization 
consisting of formal structures and the goal is fast improvements.47  Commanding 
changes can be driven by powerful CEOs, by Congressional law or from flag level 
officers within the Navy.  Engineering intervention is focused on processes and 
productivity efficiencies.  Engineering change is likely to be successful when only 
processes need to be changed.  These efficiencies can be gained by changing 
organizational structure, conducting a Lean Six Sigma project or changing accounting 
information systems.  Teaching intervention refers to change that is accomplished by 
training; this intervention is successful when the change targets actively participate in 
their reeducation.48  Teaching change is likely to be effective when the purpose of change 
is to develop organizational capabilities.  Teaching change includes correcting 
discrepancies from outside audits or investigations, conducting site visits, or adopting 
best practices from industry.  Socializing intervention involves a change agent actively 
trying to improve the quality of social relationships within an organization.  It is 
generally assumed that socialized change among individuals will result in larger 
organizational change.49  Socialized change can include grassroots change movements 
from within organization’s lower levels or simply by individuals following the lead of a 
respected co-worker.   
Huy’s change model is summarized in Table 1.  The table lists the intervention 
types listed above, the employee’s conception of time, entrainment by factors (or where 
the impetus for change comes from), the time perspective and the pacing of the change.   
                                                 





Table 1.   Temporal Assumptions of Change Intervention Ideal Types (After Huy, 2001) 
 Huy notes that none of the change intervention methods can by themselves lead to 
large-scale change.  Each intervention type, enacted alone, has potential limitations.  The 
commanding intervention can lead to resentment by personnel and resistance to change; it 
rarely leads to lasting and pervasive changes in values and beliefs.  The engineering 
intervention can lead to isolated segments.  Successful pilot studies in process 
improvements such as a Lean Six Sigma project rarely spread to the whole organization, 
ironically the very success of a pilot can lead to resentment in other segments.  The 
teaching intervention is based in cognitive change and it has been found that cognitive 
change does not always lead to sustained behavioral change.  Too much socializing could 
lead to an unorganized workplace that loses sight of headquarters’ goals.  Groups with 
differing perspectives can compete for scarce resources and not use resources in the best 
interest of the organization.50 
 The Huy model recognizes that, “Large-scale change, by definition, involves a 
significant alteration of many organizational elements, such as formal structures, work 
systems, beliefs, and social relationships.”51  Since none of the intervention approaches 
alone will create lasting change and can even create negative consequences, Huy 
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Time Perspective  Near-Term Medium-Term Moderately Long-Term Long-Term 
Pacing  Abrupt, Rapid Moderately Fast Gradual Gradual 
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proposes that managers need to be able to carefully mix and match intervention 
approaches.  This mixing and matching incorporates different concepts of time and 
conducts the proper sequencing of interventions.   
 To overcome these potential negative consequences of enacted change, Huy 
proposes that change agents have to be “temporally capable.”  This includes sequencing, 
time, pacing and combining multiple intervention types.  This juxtaposition can be best 
described as a continuum with two extremes.  The first is pure sequencing, only using 
one intervention type at a time.  The second is pure combining, utilizing all four 
intervention types at the same time.52  Due to the nature of the federal government and 
the commanding nature of Congress, the Secretary of Defense, and the flag-level officers 
leading the business transformation efforts within DoD and the Navy, this thesis focuses 
on Huy’s proposition that starting large-scale change with a commanding intervention is 
effective given the right environment.   
 Huy states that starting large-scale change with a commanding intervention is 
more likely to enact changes that persist in organizations that are hierarchical in nature 
and whose employees accept that hierarchical state.53  The change is also more likely 
when the organization has slack resources and where the change agents’ power is 
concentrated in a relatively small cadre of leaders.54  The commanding intervention must 
have clear business logic and must be followed with the other three intervention 
approaches to allow the organization to create a new process that enables the change to 
persist and to repair any damages done to the “social fabric” of the organization.55 
 As the succeeding chapters will show, the natures of both the Corporation and the 
Navy meet the criteria for enacting positive change starting with the commanding 
intervention style.  Through the passage of laws, direction from top-level leadership, re-
engineering processes and organizational structures, training efforts and socializing the 
changes; both entities have attempted business transformation efforts with varying 
                                                 





degrees of success.  The next chapter provides a narrative history of the efforts 
undertaken by the Corporation to improve its financial management practices after a 









III. THE EXPERIENCES OF THE CORPORATION FOR 
NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE AND THE NATIONAL 
SERVICE TRUST 
A. BACKGROUND 
This section provides a background of the Corporation for National and 
Community Service.  It begins with a brief background of the conception and 
organization of the Corporation and then discusses the events that led to the 2002 ADA 
violation.  By understanding how the Corporation is organized and what problems led to 
the ADA violation, a better appreciation of the changes implemented by the Corporation 
and how those changes can be applied to the Navy financial management community can 
be gained.   
1. The Corporation for National and Community Service 
According to their 2003 annual report, “The Corporation for National and 
Community Service (hereon the “Corporation”) was established in 1993 to engage 
Americans of all ages and backgrounds in community service.”56  The Corporation 
supports a range of national and community service programs, providing opportunities 
for individuals to serve full or part time or as part of a team.  The Corporation works with 
governor-appointed state commissions, nonprofit organizations, community-based 
organizations, schools, and other civic organizations to provide opportunities for all 
Americans to serve their communities.  President William J. Clinton signed the National 
and Community Service Trust Act of 1993 that created the Corporation.  Rather than 
provide services directly, the Corporation provides a framework of programs for public 
and community service through state commissions, nonprofit groups, faith-based and 
other civic organizations.  The Corporation’s three major service programs are Senior 
                                                 
56 The Corporation for National and Community Service, Performance and Accountability Report, 
Fiscal Year 2003.  Available from http://www.nationalservice.org/about/role_impact/performance.asp, 
accessed May 11, 2007. 
 26
Corps, AmeriCorps and Learn and Serve America (Appendix A details the Corporation’s 
major programs and is taken from the Corporation’s website).57 
To facilitate its relationships with the private and nonprofit sector entities it relies 
on to meet its mission, the Corporation operates differently from most federal agencies.  
The organization “resulted partly from the Clinton-Gore administration’s efforts to adopt 
New Public Management principles and run government agencies in a more business-like 
fashion.”58  The Corporation’s structure resembles that of a private sector, for-profit 
organization with a Board of Directors, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer 
and Chief Financial Officer (Appendix B is an organizational chart of the Corporation 
taken from the Corporation’s 2006 Performance and Accountability Report).59   
2. Americorps and the National Service Trust 
As stated in the Corporation’s 2006 Performance and Accountability Report, 
AmeriCorps is a network of national service programs that engages over one million 
community volunteers to perform services such as building housing, responding to 
natural disasters and mentoring youth.  AmeriCorps members earn up to $4,725 to help 
finance their education upon completion of their service.60 
The National and Community Service Trust Act of 1993 established the National 
Service Trust (Trust) to fund education awards and to pay the interest that accrues on 




                                                 
57 From the Corporation’s Performance and Accountability Report for FY 2006.  Appendix A. 
58 Philip J. Candreva., “National Service Trust: A Case Study”, Naval Postgraduate School.  July 
2004. 
59 Appendix B shows the Corporation’s organizational structure as depicted in their fiscal year 2006 
Performance and Accountability Report (annual report).   
60 The Corporation for National and Community Service, Performance and Accountability Report, 
Fiscal Year 2006.  Available from http://www.nationalservice.org/about/role_impact/performance.asp, 
accessed May 11, 2007. 
61 42 U.S.C. §§ 12501-681 (2003). 
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for AmeriCorps participants.  The Trust was modeled on the GI Bill of the 1940’s; the 
education award compensates citizens for national service by investing in their higher 
education.62   
To earn the full award of $4,725, each AmeriCorps member must complete one 
full-time term (at least 1700 hours in 9-12 months).  If a member completes a part-time 
term, such as a summer program, they are eligible for a “reduced-time award,” usually 
$1,000 or less.  Americorps members can only receive up to two education awards for 
their first two terms of service, regardless of whether they are for full-time, part-time or 
reduced-time terms.  If a member does not complete one of their first two terms of 
service they cannot receive an award for a third term.63 
The education awards can be used to repay qualified student loans, pay the excess 
costs of attending a qualified institution of higher education or cover the expenses 
incurred in participating in an approved school-to-work program.  Education awards are 
paid directly to members’ qualified schools and lenders.  Education awards can be used 
any time after receiving a completion of service voucher for up to seven years after the 
date of service completion.64 
The National Service Trust works much like a working capital fund that pays the 
education awards earned by AmeriCorps volunteers.  Each fiscal year, the Corporation 
requests, and Congress appropriates, a designated amount of money to be used solely to 
fund the Trust.  Funds for the Trust were provided through the annual Veterans Affairs, 
Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies appropriation bill from 
1993 to 2006.  After fiscal year 2006, funds for the Trust are provided in the Department 
of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education and Related Agencies 
appropriation bill.  Unlike most congressional appropriations, these funds are 
appropriated on a no-year basis.  That is, they do not expire for obligation purposes at the 
end of the fiscal year, so they remain within the Trust until disbursed in an education 
                                                 
62 AmeriCorps Member Handbook (September 1997). 
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64 Ibid. 
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award.65  Funds in the Trust are subject to federal appropriation law with respect to the 
fund’s purpose (U.S.C. § 1301a) and amount (Anti-Deficiency Act, U.S.C. § 1341).  The 
funds in the Trust are allowed to be invested in Treasury instruments of the United States 
and these earning grow the fund’s balance.66  The Corporation was appropriated separate 
funds to pay for program expenses and administrative expenses; however, these funds 
could not be used to pay for education awards.  Upon its inception in 1993, the 
Corporation struggled to make decisions regarding obligation reporting and budgeting for 
the Trust. 
In the early stages of Trust management there was little oversight and almost no 
historical data supporting a decision on when an obligation should be recorded. This was 
mainly due to the way the Trust was conceived; this was to be a new way of doing 
business and there were no organizations in the US government to use as a template.  
“When the Trust was initially created, the Corporation, in consultation with the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), recorded Trust obligations based on amounts outlayed.  
This method was accepted, implemented and, until recently, continued unchallenged.”67  
This method was accepted by both OMB and GAO until 2003.    
Due to a lack of program history, the Corporation found it difficult to estimate 
AmeriCorps enrollment.  By the end of 1995, it became evident that AmeriCorps 
enrollment failed to reach the initial estimate.  In addition, the Corporation realized that 
not all enrollees were successfully completing their terms of service and earning their 
education awards.68  It became apparent that the Corporation needed a model to estimate 
both enrollment and education award payments to correctly budget for operations of the 
Trust. 
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66 Ibid. 
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Based on experience during the early years of operation, the former Senior 
Director for Budget and Trust developed a series of statistical models in 1996.  
According to the Director for Budget and Trust:   
These formulas estimated data such as the number of enrollees who would 
successfully complete their service, when they would complete their 
service, and when, after completing their service, they would claim their 
education award.  In addition to estimating the number of AmeriCorps 
members who would claim an education award, the formulas were also 
used to estimate the average amount of an education award.  These early 
formulas, which were also used to forecast estimated future funding 
requirements for the Trust, evolved into the Service Award Liability 
(SAL) model.  The model attempted to provide better management of the 
Trust’s funds and more accurate liability data for the Corporation’s 
financial statements.69 
Due to errors inherent in the SAL model, earnings from the interest on the corpus 
invested in government paper, and continued Congressional appropriations, the balance 
in the trust grew much faster than anticipated and appeared to exceed requirements.  
After several investigations into the management of the Trust, Congress rescinded $81 
million from the Trust and in 2001 an additional $30 million.70    
During the first three years of operation, the Corporation struggled with routine 
administrative matters such as accounting, and the Corporation’s financial statements 
were not subject to independent audit from fiscal year 1994 to fiscal year 1996.71  During 
this period the financial statements were not deemed auditable and the audit opinions 
were disclaimed.  After these initial problems were solved, the Corporation, like many 
government agencies, struggled to obtain a clean audit opinion.  Table 2 details the 
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external audit, the auditor notes that its audits are conducted in compliance with 
Government Auditing Standards as delineated by the Comptroller General of the United 
States.72 
  
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Type of Opinion D D D Q/BS U/BS U/BS U U U U U U U
Number of Material Weaknesses N/A N/A 10 7 8 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Number of Reportable Conditions N/A N/A 0 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1
D - disclaimed opinion, statements were not auditable
Q/BS = the Balance Sheet only received a qualified opinion, all other statements 
were disclaimed
U/BS = the Balance Sheet only received an unqualified opinion, all other statements 
were disclaimed
U = all statements received an unqualified opinion
Financial statements for fiscal years 1994 - 1996 were not subject to independent audit. Fiscal years 1997 
through 2002 were audited by KPMG, fiscal years 2003 through 2006 were audited by Cotton and Company.
Source:  Adapted from Philip J. Candreva, "National Service Trust: A Case Study" and the Corporation for
National and Community Service Performance and Accountability Reports Fiscal Years 2003 - 2005.  
Table 2.   Path to Auditability (After Candreva, 2004). 
It is interesting to note that the first unqualified audit coincided with the first 
Congressional rescission and that many of the problems the Corporation had with 
financial management occurred after they obtained clean audit opinions. 
B. THE CORPORATION’S ANTI-DEFICIENCY ACT VIOLATION 
As the Corporation struggled through its growing pains, it missed several key 
indicators that its financial status was in a precarious position.  Management turnover, 
Congressional rescissions, program growth, inadequate budget models and time-late 
accounting information systems all led to the ADA violation that is described below.  
1. The Trust Cannot Support Enrolled Members 
For most of 2001, the Corporation lacked a confirmed Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) due to the change in Presidential administrations.  The former Chief Operating 
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Officer filled the role during this time.  The acting CEO and senior management realized 
that the budget was going to be cut based on prior year rescissions and discussions with 
OMB and Congressional staff.  According to the acting CEO, “The Corporation believed 
that they could meet the Administration’s budget reduction goals by not requesting 
additional appropriations for the Trust.”73  As a result, the Corporation senior 
management requested no appropriations for the Trust in their fiscal year 2002.  As 
justification, the Corporation noted that they expected interest earnings in the Trust to 
lower requirement for new budget authority, levels of AmeriCorps members to remain at 
current levels and that the Trust balance was sufficient to cover estimated education 
award liabilities for 2002 .74 
In May 2001, Senators Christopher S. Bond and Barbara A. Mikulski requested 
that the Corporation’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) review the methodology 
used by the Corporation in determining that no additional Trust appropriations were 
necessary for fiscal year 2002 (Appendix C).75  The Corporation’s OIG contracted with 
the accounting firm KPMG LLP to perform this review.  KPMG’s review concluded that 
the Trust would be solvent during fiscal 2002 and that no new appropriations were 
required from Congress.  KPMG did stipulate that an additional $75 million would need 
to be appropriated during fiscal year 2003 to sustain the Trust.  This statement assumed 
that Congress elected to continue AmeriCorps membership at levels consistent with the 
past several years.76  
For program years 2001 and 2002 the number of approved AmeriCorps positions 
“exceeded estimated enrollment for Trust liability purposes, but this situation was not 
considered unusual because it was expected that not all AmeriCorps members would 
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complete their terms of service or use their education award.” 77  In fact, possibly due to 
the terrorist attacks of 2001, enrollment spiked during 2002.  
Corporation management did not anticipate the effect that increased enrollment 
would have on the Trust.  Management focused on expanded service to the community 
and the benefits of increased enrollment, yet it missed warnings that the Trust was in an 
untenable position.  In July 2002, the former Director of Programming sent an email to 
the Corporation’s CEO stating that enrollment could reach 58,000 by the end of 2002, 
8,000 more members than authorized by Congress.  The CEO responded that this was a 
“VERY good thing.”78  This indicated that management was more concerned with 
meeting the President’s objectives of growing the force and not on the financial 
management and fiscal law implications inherent with that growth.  The next month the 
Director of Programming sent another email to the CEO and senior management stating 
that enrollment had reached 60,000, an all time high.  He also stated that the trust funding 
estimates would have to be evaluated and updated “as we go forward.  We have a critical 
need for more resources in the Trust over the next couple of years…Unless this is fixed, 
we will have a very real future problem.”79  It was at this point that management began to 
realize that the program growth may have legal implications.  The situation was 
succinctly articulated in a report conducted by GAO.  
According to the GAO report: 
Late in calendar year 2002, Corporation management began to realize that 
the Trust liabilities might exceed assets.  Compounding the effect of 
increased enrollment on the Trust, Congress passed a series of continuing 
resolutions during its annual appropriations period that allowed the 
Corporation and other federal agencies to receive budget authority based 
on prior year’s authorizations.  Since the Corporation had not requested 
nor received fiscal year 2002 appropriations for the Trust, no additional 
funds for the Trust were provided by the continuing resolutions.80 
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On November 15, 2002, the Corporation sent notification to Congress and OMB 
that enrollments had been “paused.”  The rationale behind this pause was an attempt to 
stop the Trust’s liabilities from exceeding Trust assets.81  Congress requested on 
November 20, 2002, that the Corporation’s OIG investigate the circumstances that led to 
the pause and to determine the solvency of the Trust.  In addition, Congress requested 
that the OIG investigate “a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act, since it appears that the 
Corporation created more liabilities than it has resources for.  (Appendix D is a copy of 
the letter from Congress to Corporation’s OIG)”82 
2. Diverging Legal Opinions 
During the OIG’s inquiry, the question of when the Corporation should record a 
Trust obligation became the key to determining if the Anti-Deficiency Act had been 
violated.  Since 1994, the Corporation had been recording a Trust obligation when a 
payment was made to a qualifying member’s approved educational institution.  The 
Corporation felt that since it was impossible to determine the exact amount of Trust 
liabilities at any given time, this was the most responsible use of taxpayer money.  By not 
obligating all potential awards and using the SAL model to estimate liabilities, excess 
funds in the corpus could be invested and allow the Trust to grow.  The Corporation 
based this on historical usage data showing that not all AmeriCorps members would 
actually earn the education award, and of those that earned the award, not all would 
actually claim it.  The Corporation therefore decided to record obligations at or near the 
time of payment.  This practice previously went unchallenged by Congress, the GAO, 
and OMB.83  The timing of obligation recording is not set in fiscal law and this issue had 
not caused problems with the Trust prior to 2002.  However, when the circumstances in 
the fall of 2002 arose, GAO and OMB could not reach agreement of when the 
Corporation should record an obligation.  In total there were five legal opinions issued by 
OMB and GAO between April and June of 2003.  
                                                 
81 OIG Report 03-007. 
82 Letter from the Honorable Christopher S. Bond to the Honorable J. Russell George (November 20, 
2002).  Exhibit D. 
83 OIG Report 03-007, 10. 
 34
In April 2003, the Corporations’ Inspector General testified before Congress that 
he had not found evidence to substantiate a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act.  The 
Corporation’s audited financial statements supported this testimony; the financial 
statements reflected that Trust liabilities did not exceed Trust assets at any time.84  This 
testimony sparked the debate between OMB and GAO.  OMB felt that the Corporation 
should be allowed to use net present value to record an obligation based on the SAL 
model, but GAO disagreed. 
GAO offered a final response and disagreed with OMB’s opinion that allowed the 
Corporation to use estimates.  GAO continued to advocate that the Corporation “record 
the maximum potential liability to cover the education benefits of new participants at the 
time the Corporation authorizes a grant recipient to fill positions.”85  It also noted that the 
Corporation could seek legislation permitting it to use an estimation model for recording 
its obligations.”86 
The OMB requested that the Corporation reconstruct the Trust’s finances since 
inception.  The Deputy Chief Financial Officer reconstructed the Trust’s financial status 
beginning in 1994.  The reconstruction was based on the reporting methodology for OMB 
SF 133 and used the OMB definition of the obligation point, which was more 
conservative that what the Corporation had been using.87  The OMB standard definition 
records an obligation well before outlay, but it was more liberal that the GAO 
recommendation.  This new definition significantly changed the financial standing of the 
Trust.  According to the OIG, “this reconstruction revealed that the Trust’s liabilities, 
based on education awards and expected interest forbearance due, exceeded the Trust’s 
appropriations and interest earnings beginning in 2000.”88  This violation of the Anti-
Deficiency Act continued until Congress and the President took action. 
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C. OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE 
The ADA violation, when using reconstructed financial statements, was 
determined to be $63 million.  There was no way for the Corporation to remedy the 
situation without an appropriation from Congress.  Both the President and Congress were 
quick to take action to remedy the ADA violation and the financial management 
problems of the Corporation. 
1. Legislative Response 
On June 20, 2003, Senator Barbara A. Mikulski, ranking member on the 
Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies, sent a letter to the President 
(Appendix E is from the Corporation’s OIG report 07-003).89  This letter sought the 
President’s support to end the ongoing legal battle between the Corporation, OMB and 
GAO.  In the letter, Senator Mukulski requested that the President request supplemental 
funding, fill vacancies on the Corporation’s Board of Directors and to appoint strong 
leadership (she had requested that the then current CEO submit his resignation).  The last 
line of the letter, “I look forward to working with you to strengthen AmeriCorps for the 
future,” clearly shows that she already had a plan in mind. 
On July 2, 2003, the Strengthen AmeriCorps Program Act (SAPA) passed both 
houses of congress in one day and was signed into law by President Bush on July 3, 
2003, the very next day.  The Act settled the dispute relating to obligation recording that 
had been ongoing since November 2002.  The Act required five changes related to the 
financial management of the Corporation. 
1. The Act stated that the Corporation, shall approve the position at the time the 
Corporation: “(1) enters into an enforceable agreement with an individual 
participant to serve in NCCC or VISTA; or (2) awards a grant to enter into a 
contract or cooperative agreement with an entity to carry out a program for which 
such a national service position may be approved under NSCA (AmeriCorps).”90 
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2. The Act required the Corporation to record as an obligation “an estimate of the 
net present value of the national service educational award associated with the 
position, based on a formula, determined in consultation with the Director of the 
Congressional Budget Office, that takes into consideration historical rates of 
enrollment in, and or earning and using such awards for, such a program.”91 
3. The Act directed the CEO to report annually and to certify to Congress that the 
Corporation is in compliance with the Act requirements for position approval and 
obligation recording.  This provision is very similar to the requirements of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.   
4. The Act directed the Corporation to establish a reserve account within the Trust to 
ensure availability of adequate funds to support the awards of approved positions 
for each fiscal year.92  It also prohibited the Corporation from obligating reserve 
funds unless: “(1) it determines that such funds will not be needed to pay awards 
associated with previously approved national service positions; or (2) obligates 
the funds to pay such awards for such previously approved positions.”93 
5. Finally, the Act directed that the Corporation obtain independent audits of 
Corporation accounts relating to Trust funds that were appropriated by Congress 
and the records that were used to estimate the liabilities against the Trust.  
Further, all amounts included in the Trust were to be available for payments of 
national service educational awards under NCSA.94 
The act also ended the Anti-Deficiency Act violation condition that, as 
reconstructed, had existed since 2000 by legitimizing the Corporation’s use of estimates 
in recording the value of education awards.   
2. The President Reinforces the Act 
To further strengthen management of AmeriCorps and the Trust, President 
George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13331 of February 27, 2004.  The Order states 
the desire, “…to strengthen the ability of programs authorized under the national service 
laws to build and reinforce a culture of service, citizenship, and responsibility throughout 
our Nation, and to institute reforms to improve accountability and efficiency in the 
administration of those programs.”95  Section 4 deals specifically with management and 
is detailed below: 
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Sec. 4.  Management Reforms.  (a) The Corporation should implement 
internal management reforms to strengthen its oversight of national and 
community service programs through enforcement of performance and 
compliance standards and other management tools. 
(b) Management reforms should include, but not be limited to the 
following: 
(i) Institutional changes to the budgetary and grant-making processes to 
ensure that financial commitments remain within available resources; 
(ii) Enhanced accounting and management systems that would ensure 
compliance with fiscal restrictions and provide timely, accurate, and 
readily available information about enrollment in AmeriCorps and about 
funding and obligations incurred for all national and community service 
programs; 
(iii) Assurance by the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial 
Officer in the Corporation’s Management Representation Letter that its 
financial statements, including the Statement of Budgetary Resources, are 
accurate and reliable; and 
(iv) Management reforms that tie employee performance to fiscal 
responsibility, attainment of management goals, and professional 
conduct.96 
 
D. OFFICIAL FINDINGS 
At the behest of Congress, the Corporation’s OIG, GAO and the National 
Academy of Public Administration conducted separate investigations to find the 
underlying causes of the ADA violations and management problems at the Corporation.  
The official findings are outlined below. 
1.   Office of the Inspector General Findings and Recommendations 
On July 24, 2003, the Corporation’s IG, at the request of Congress, released a 
report titled “The National Service Trust: Internal Control Weaknesses Cause an Anti-
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Deficiency Act Violation at the Corporation for National and Community Service”.  The 
report detailed the background of AmeriCorps and Trust operations.  It then outlined 
management’s surprise as problems began to surface and how early warnings of problems 
were missed by management.  During the course of the investigation, it became clear that 
Corporation procedures for enrolling AmeriCorps members lacked internal controls and 
guidelines.97  The investigation identified conditions that contributed to a breakdown in 
communications and coordination between the corporation’s budget development 
functions, the AmeriCorps program office, and the Trust office.  As a result, the 
Corporation had no effective system for monitoring AmeriCorps member enrollment and 
comparing enrollment to Trust funding levels.  The Inspector General issued five 
recommendations as a result of this investigation: 
1.  Only qualified Trust personnel be allowed to make liability projections and 
have input on Trust budgetary decisions. 
2.  The Corporation use position descriptions and an accurate organizational chart 
to establish responsibility, accountability, and authority for all key Trust positions. 
3.  The Corporation develop an automated, joint method for simultaneously 
analyzing information in both databases (Web Based Reporting System (WBRS) and 
eSPAN).  This joint method was to provide real-time reports indicating the impact of 
changes in enrollment on the Trust. 
4.  Automated alerts be established with the WBRS and eSPAN to warn grant 
officers, AmeriCorps program officers, and Trust employees of potential problems 
regarding enrollment activities.  The OIG further recommended that automated 
safeguards be established in all enrollment systems to prevent enrollment from exceeding 
predetermined levels.  “While the WBRS limited over-enrollment on a grant-by-grant 
basis, cumulative enrollment safeguards should be programmed into these systems.”98 
5.  The Corporation publish formal guidance regarding the use of the Service 
Award Liability model.  The guidance was to describe who would have access to the 
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model, when it would be run, where and how to obtain model data, and to whom the 
generated reports would be sent for review.99 
2. GAO Findings and Recommendations 
Six months later, GAO released a report to congressional requestors titled 
“Corporation for National and Community Service: Better Internal Control and Revised 
Practices Would Improve the Management of AmeriCorps and the National Service 
Trust”.  The GAO found that in the time between the Corporation’s OIG report and the 
GAO report that some of the internal control weaknesses had been addressed, but that 
other problems remained.  Congress asked GAO to answer three important questions.  
Congress wanted to know, “(1) Has all AmeriCorps participant information been 
accurately recorded in the Trust database? (2) How does the Corporation estimate the 
funding needed to provide education awards through the Trust?  (3) Has the Corporation 
made management and operational changes that ensure enrollments will not be suspended 
in the future and that address the Strengthen AmeriCorps Program Act requirements?”100 
GAO found that about 3 percent of enrollments had a discrepancy between the 
Trust database and participant documentation that could affect estimates of future 
probable expenditures of the Trust (5 percent of enrollments had discrepancies 
overall).101  Further, the Corporation had changed the estimation model (SAL) to be more 
conservative in order to regain credibility with Congress and its grantees.  GAO found 
that this model increased estimated funding needed for the Trust and that it did not 
consider external factors that could impact participant enrollment.  Finally, GAO found 
“that management and operational changes should reduce the risk of enrollment 
suspensions, but that some of the new policies may hinder service delivery and could 
contribute to higher balances in the Trust.”102  
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To improve the management of AmeriCorps and the National Service Trust, GAO 
recommended that the CEO of the Corporation take the following nine actions: 
1. Implement a strategy to correct discrepancies between the Trust 
database and the enrollment and exit forms. 
2. Review and document the effectiveness of data assurance processes. 
3. Regularly verify the accuracy of the SSNs of participants. 
4. Update the users’ manual for the Trust database and develop an 
inventory of edit and data checks used for the database. 
5. Obtain an auditor’s opinion on the adequacy of the internal control 
over financial reporting as part of the annual financial statement audit. 
6. Create a means to take into account the possible impact that external 
factors may have on participant behavior in Trust funding estimates 
and budget requests. 
7. Establish and execute a periodic deobligation schedule for unused 
Trust obligations. 
8. Review the assumptions being used in the new funding model after the 
Corporation gains more experience with the new model and current 
participant behavior. 
9. Evaluate the enrollment policies regarding refilling and converting 
participant positions.103 
 
3. National Academy of Public Administration Findings and 
Recommendations 
At the request of Congress, the National Academy of Public Administration 
(NAPA), reviewed the Corporation’s leadership, organization and operations.  In October 
2005, NAPA published a report titled “The Corporation for National and Community 
Service: Building a Foundation for the Future”.  The study noted overall that 
Congressional action and new procedures adopted by the Corporation’s leadership cured 
the specific problems that led to the Anti-Deficiency Act violation.  However, it goes on 
further to state that “despite progress in many areas, the Corporation still had many 
challenges to overcome if it were to become a preeminent organization.”104  NAPA 
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found eight areas for improvement; however, this thesis focuses on the four that impact 
financial management: the board of directors, grants management, financial management 
and strategic management. 
NAPA noted that the Corporation’s board of directors is unusual in that it is 
neither advisory nor governing.  The Corporation’s board has attributes of both, but 
cannot be either “due to statutory restrictions and the expectations of members of 
Congress.”105  NAPA stated that the Corporation’s board should evolve to become more 
like a governing board that is involved in setting the strategic direction for the 
Corporation.  NAPA noted that to strengthen the board Congress will have to pass 
legislation that “(1) requires the board to submit to the President annually a review of the 
CEO’s performance, with its recommendation to retain or remove the CEO, and (2) 
requires the Board to review the Corporation’s budget request in advance of submission 
to OMB and Congress.”106 
In the area of grants management, NAPA suggested improvements that they 
believed would at the margins.  The report noted that what was needed to enable the 
Corporation to manage its grants management workload over the long term was a radical 
new approach.  This approach would need to reduce the workload burden while 
maintaining service levels, but left that radical change up to Corporation management.  
The short-term changes focused on submitting legislative proposals that changed the way 
that matching requirements and pushing more grant awarding responsibility down to 
lower levels. 
NAPA noted that by October 2005, the Corporation had made significant 
improvements in its financial management.  NAPA stated that critical to improving 
financial operations “was a rationalization of the underlying financial information 
systems.”107  The panel recommended that the Corporation’s Chief Information Officer  
 
                                                 
105 NAPA Academy Project Number 2044-000, xii. 
106 Ibid, xii. 
107 Ibid, xiv. 
 42
be delegated authority and oversight for the Corporation’s information technology 
resources as delineated by the Clinger-Cohen Act, just the DoD’s CIO must approve 
financial management systems. 
NAPA noted that the Corporation had devoted significant time to making the 
organization more strategy-centered and results-oriented.  By October 2005 the 
Corporation had responded to the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and 
other government-wide requirements.  The Corporation had also released its strategic 
vision that covered 2006-2011.  NAPA recommended that “future strategic planning be 
unified by involving all the necessary players in the process and turn its planning into the 
basis for managing the Corporation.”108  This future planning and strategic forethought is 
similar to DoD’s future years defense plan (FYDP).  A timeline of major events is 
provided below (external events are depicted on the bottom and the Corporation’s actions 
on the top of the figure): 
 
Figure 3.   Timeline of the Experiences of the Corporation 
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E. THE CORPORATION’S RESPONSES 
The Corporation began to implement changes almost as soon as its problems were 
discovered.  The early responses focused on ensuring that another ADA violation would 
not occur.  However, the Corporation went much further than that.  The actions taken to 
remedy problems found by the OIG, GAO and NAPA were swift and embraced by the 
organization.  It is interesting to note that in its first 10 years of existence the Corporation 
had over 10 investigations at the direction of Congress, mainly related to financial 
management issues.  Since the release of the NAPA report, the Congress has not had a 
reason to request an investigation.  In fact, by 2007, Congress had expanded the program 
to 100,000 AmeriCorps members and had lauded the Corporation for excellence in 
financial management.  The Corporation began its change process by rapidly responding 
to recommendations by its IG and GAO.  An aggressive teaching program was put into 
effect that ensured that employees understood the significance of the required change.  
Systems that dealt with financial information were incrementally upgraded to meet the 
requirements of SAPA and Executive Order 13331.  As the changes were made, the 
Corporation continued to provide training and socializing to ensure that its employees not 
only understood the new systems, but that a new culture of excellence developed.  These 
changes are examined in detail below. 
In January 2003, before Congress, the Corporation’s OIG, GAO or NAPA could 
comment on the problems that led to the Anti-Deficiency Act violation, the CEO released 
a memorandum for employees of the Corporation.  This memo addressed new procedures 
for AmeriCorps and the Chief Financial Officer (Appendix F). 
In the CEO’s message in the fiscal year 2003 Performance and Accountability 
Report (PAR), the CEO discussed the financial problems associated with the Trust, but 
noted that several positive changes were underway.  He stated that compliance with 
SAPA had resolved many of the problems by statutorily determining the way to account 
for Trust obligations.  Further, he stated that the appointment of a new CFO and many 
new financial procedures had done much to get the Corporation on the right path. 
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The Corporation also noted that in fiscal 2003 data quality was an important issue.  
The Corporation is highly decentralized and relies on data flow to ensure accuracy of 
financial information.  Information necessarily flows from the Corporation to its grantees 
and from grantees to the Corporation.  Information on new volunteers enrolled, balances 
in the Trust, projections on remaining volunteer slots, each grantees’ share of vacant 
volunteer slots and other key financial data were closely interlinked.  The time-late nature 
of the existing systems did not provide timely, accurate or reliable information for 
management to make business decisions.  In addition, the Corporation found that the data 
entered into the systems, in addition to being time-late, were not accurate.  According to 
the fiscal year 2003 PAR, “The focus of the Corporation’s data quality efforts has been 
on assessing the internal data system controls and their effect on the accuracy of 
performance information.”109  The Corporation recognized that the degree of accuracy 
was related to the degree of decentralization of the reporting entity.  By 2004, the 
Corporation was working to include data assurance initiatives by building a new 
performance measurement system for all programs.110  This new system was designed to 
measure the accuracy and timeliness of grantee data entry into the eSpan system to ensure 
that accurate counts of new members were visible at the corporate level. 
In the 2003 PAR the newly appointed CFO stated, “Achieving good financial 
standing as a steward of taxpayer funds is crucial to helping the Corporation meet a key 
strategic goal: developing and maintaining a sound, innovative organization that 
strengthens the service field.”111  In fiscal year 2003 the Corporation received its fourth 
consecutive clean audit opinion.  This however, did not mean that the Corporation was 
financially sound.  According to the fiscal year 2003 PAR, the management controls 
assessment was based on the controls that include the announcement of funds availability 
for grants, the receipt and evaluation of applications for financial assistance, the 
negotiation and award of grants, and cooperative agreements.112  The report also noted 
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that the $63.1 million ADA violation that occurred between June 20, 2002 and September 
30, 2002 was covered by a $64 million deficiency appropriation passed in the spring of 
2003 as a part of the war supplemental, PL. 108-11.  As a result of the ADA violation the 
CFO proposed several corrective actions relating to Trust management and grants 
approval.  These corrective actions included: 
• estimating total FTE and member slots available with the appropriation 
and allocating them to programs before any awards are made; 
• obtaining CFO certification of the program and Trust costs prior to grant 
approval; 
• recording Trust obligations concurrent with the grant award process; 
• automating safeguards in the Web Based Reporting System that prevent 
grantees from enrolling more members then they were allotted; and 
• continuous oversight of Trust enrollments to allow for timely mid-course 
corrections if necessary.113 
 
The fiscal year 2003 external audit confirmed that the implementation of these 
controls had resolved the issue.  However, the audit recommended that the Corporation 
include a risk-based assessment of which grantees were to be selected for on-site 
monitoring visits to ensure financial data integrity. 
The above measures closed a reportable condition that had existed previously, but 
the fiscal 2003 audit conducted by Cotton & Company LLP noted that grants 
management was still considered a reportable condition.  This condition had existed since 
the fiscal year 2001 audit.  Cotton & Company recommended that: (1) the Corporation 
reevaluate its on-site monitoring based on a risk based approach, (2) state offices utilize 
tracking capabilities in eGrants to comply with policies and procedures, (3) Corporation 
staff provide timely feedback from site visits to grantees and (4) the Corporation closely 
monitor progress reports on corrective actions.114  This condition continued to exist 
during the fiscal year 2004 audit; however, the Corporation hired a Director of Grants 
Management during 2005 and corrected the reportable condition. 
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The Corporation’s CEO understood that the changes that were necessary required 
buy-in from not only management, but from front-line workers and widely dispersed 
grantees.  The CEO held a meeting with a diverse group of senior management and 
detailed the need for a team of experts to implement the changes required by SAPA and 
Executive Order and to meet the recommendations outlined by the IG and GAO.  To 
ensure compliance and to continue to strengthen its financial management practices, the 
Corporation created the Management Improvement Team (MIT).  The team was 
composed of multidisciplinary Corporation staff and its mission included three goals: to 
improve accountability and increase cost-effectiveness and efficiency, to produce an 
action agenda that would establish a lasting culture of open communications and 
management excellence, and to monitor progress and ensure full implementation of the 
action plan.115  On September 15, 2003, the Corporation issued a press release titled 
“National Service Agency Undertakes Comprehensive Effort to Strengthen 
Management.”  This release detailed an all-hands meeting between Corporation staff and 
the acting CEO and outlined the implementation of the MIT.  Noting the concerns raised 
by Congress the CEO stated, “…The Management Improvement Team is an important 
step in fully and promptly addressing those concerns and strengthening national service 
to achieve the growth that the President believes is essential…”116 According to the 
CEO, the desired outcome was “an organization whose financial management, 
information management, and human capital management practices are recognized as a 
model for other agencies.”117  In the months that followed, the MIT met with outside 
entities that had concerns about the management of the Corporation, including OMB, 
Congress and others.  In the first three months of operation the MIT completed several 
critical short-term goals identified by the OIG and GAO.  These included how the 
Corporation controlled financial information and data flow and to clarify position 
descriptions and reporting relationships.118  The acting CEO also noted that the MIT built 
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long-term management improvements by conducting a comprehensive “program 
management review” based on research of best practices of agencies that had similar 
missions and challenges.119  At the conclusion of the MIT’s work a detailed action plan 
called the “Blueprint for Management Excellence” was published to guide the 
Corporation.   
In December 2003, the current CEO was confirmed by Congress ending almost a 
year of a civil servant filling the vacancy.  The current CEO came to the agency during a 
tumultuous period and during the first year that SAPA required the CEO to certify the 
Corporation was in compliance with the SAPA. 
In February 2004, the Corporation’s Board of Directors noted that accountability 
was not only a financial matter, but involved a culture change as well.  The board asked 
the CEO and CFO to provide a metrics dashboard for tracking financial processes and 
progress.  The CEO also delineated his goals for the upcoming year.  One of which was 
to “manage to accountability” by “creating a performance culture, flattening the 
organization, and making sure that people on the front lines have input on strategic 
decisions.”120  By the time the fiscal year 2004 PAR was published the Corporation had 
issued Corporation-wide indicators for this strategy.   
The 2004 PAR also noted that the new conservative SAL model was leading to 
excessive balances in the Trust.  It stated that the Corporation was working to include 
other social and economic factors in to the model to further refine the projections.  In 
addition to improving the SAL model, the Corporation recognized the importance of 
improving its legacy financial systems.  The proposed improvements to the financial 
systems can be seen in Appendix G which is taken from the 2004 PAR.  The goal of the 
new system was to ensure timely and accurate financial information that could be used 
for decision making at all levels. 
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On March 24, 2004, the current CEO, with only 99 days in office, testified before 
the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban 
Development, and Independent Agencies to detail progress made in the past 12 months.  
The CEO reported that the Corporation was in a much better position, “…thanks to a 
number of interrelated factors, including the implementation of strict management and 
accountability procedures, passage of the Strengthen AmeriCorps Program Act, increased 
board oversight, and passage of the 2004 budget.”121  The CEO also noted that the new 
CFO had implemented procedures regarding the award of grants and enrollment of new 
members to ensure that the problems that led to the ADA violation were not repeated.  
Citing the reviews made by GAO, the OIG and the independent auditing firm Cotton and 
Company, the CEO noted some underlying weaknesses, but stated that significant 
progress had been made.  Specifically, the Corporation was in compliance with generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and SAPA, was following sound business rules 
and that management reforms were correcting identified weaknesses.122  The CEO also 
stated that to address the problems identified in 2003 they created change programs in the 
areas of information technology, internal communications, grant member application and 
reporting practices and internal personnel practices.  The result was the improved quality 
of data and the usefulness of that data.  In this testimony the CEO also specified two 
targeted budget requests that assisted in strengthening the performance and effectiveness 
of the Corporation.  The requests included $5M for training and technical assistance for 
grantees to successfully manage their programs to become more sustainable and $6.7M to 
support a sufficient level of oversight by restoring key staff and to provide training since 
the AmeriCorps program had grown by 50 percent. 
The CEO, in the same testimony, discussed his management priorities that were to 
“guide the way the Corporation conducts its business: (1) restore the trust and credibility 
with all of our stakeholders; (2) manage to accountability; and (3) keep the customer in 
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focus.”123  To meet goal number one the CEO noted that the Corporation had been more 
forthcoming with Congress by notifying in advance all significant developments, good or 
bad.  They also had been directed by the Board of Directors to engage in a rulemaking 
process to allow grantees more clarification on procedures.  To meet goal number two, as 
outlined by the 2004 Omnibus Appropriations Act, the Corporation was required to 
review its grant programs and financial systems and report to Congress the results.  The 
report was submitted to Congress on March 12, 2004.  The CEO outlined the results of 
this report in his testimony and broke it down into four areas: general management, Trust 
financial management, grant management and performance measurement.  Each are 
discussed below. 
Between the time that the Trust problems were discovered and the enrollment 
pause was lifted, the Corporation realigned management and put into place strict 
procedures to ensure that violations would not occur in the future.  As previously noted, 
passage of SAPA provided safeguards which ensured that Trust liabilities would not 
exceed Trust assets.  This external factor solved part of the problem.  The Corporation 
also was working to institutionalize reforms with regard to legal requirements of 
appropriated funds.  This was eventually distilled into a CFO numbered document.  All of 
the procedures implemented in the area of Trust management were to provide a better 
“snapshot of member enrollments” at any given time.  This increase in data quality and 
timeliness improved management oversight. 
The Trust improvements above were aimed at informed decision-making, and 
those improvements spread to other areas of general financial management.  In 2003-
2004 the Corporation created a new budget process that linked financial requests to 
performance measures.124  The budget analyst staff was also increased to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness and to close out audit reportable conditions and a backlog of 
closed grants. 
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In 2003, the Grants Management Task Force of the Board of Directors examined 
grants procedures.  As a result of the Task Force’s 2003 report, the Corporation 
established an Office of Grants Policy that was charged with overseeing the daily 
operations of the grant review process.  The CIO also improved the legacy databases to 
interconnect systems and streamline the process to improve visibility.  By linking eGrants 
with WBRS the Corporation and grantees have real-time information regarding number 
of members and financial status.   
The area of performance measures was seen as key to program accountability.  By 
the time of the Omnibus 2004 Appropriation report to Congress, all programs that applied 
for funding from the Corporation had instituted performance measures commensurate 
with their individual programs.  To continue momentum in the area of performance 
measures, the Corporation contracted with the Urban Institute and Abt Association and 
consulted with several experts to improve this area for the future.   
In a press release from the Office of the CEO, the CEO noted that FY04 was a 
“turnaround” year for the Corporation.125  In outlining the major accomplishments of the 
Corporation over the last year the CEO states, 
As I have detailed in testimony before Congress and elsewhere, the 
Corporation has moved steadily and surely over the past 12 months to 
establish financially and managerially sound systems and processes. For 
example, in FY 2004 we: 
Put in place new procedures that fix the problems that we had experienced 
in the past with the National Service Trust; 
Strengthened our grants management, oversight, and monitoring functions 
including reforming the grant making process, improving the quality of 
peer reviewers, and implementing improvements to eGrants, our online 
grant application system; 
Instituted a new budget development approach in which each department 
uses a logic model that ties budgeting to goals and performance; 
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Upgraded technological systems to ensure more accurate and timely 
reporting of data; 
Developed new administrative standards for out state service 
commissions, and implemented improved compliance monitoring 
protocols; 
Developed a comprehensive strategic human capital plan; and 
Ended the predominant use of term appointments, expanded employee 
training, and implemented a performance-based appraisal system.126  
 
Because of these changes several key milestones were met.  A review of the 
Corporations’ financial systems found that the systems conformed to governmental 
standards outlined in the Financial Management Improvement Act.  Management 
controls were found to be in compliance with the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity 
Act, with the exception of one area that was cleared in January of 2005.  The GAO and 
OIG both found that the Corporation had sound business practices including strict 
controls over appropriated funds.  For the fifth straight year the Corporation received an 
unqualified opinion of its financial statements.   
Several areas focusing on long-term sustainability were also addressed in the 
CEO message on the 2004 PAR.  These included: 
1.  The Board of Directors began to outline a five-year strategic plan that 
incorporated recommendations from Executive Order 13331. 
2.  Deloitte reviewed core business practices, the results were incorporated to 
enhance reforms already completed. 
3.  NAPA continued to review Corporation operations and the final report due in 
2005 was used to further enhance reforms.   
4.  The Corporation implemented the strategic human capital plan that was 
developed in 2003, this plan aligned staff with Corporation goals. 
                                                 
126 Corporation Press Release, Wednesday, November 24, 2004, 1. 
 52
5.  As directed by the Board of Directors, the Corporation developed a 
management metrics dashboard to allow visibility of performance targets. 
6.  The Corporation continued with the rule making process to make programs 
more predictable and reliable for grantees.  This rule also endeavored to better leverage 
federal resources. 
7.  The Corporation continued to upgrade technological resources to build upon 
legacy systems.  This included new designs for eGrants and WBRS. 
On October 1, 2006, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer issued a numbered 
policy and procedure document titled CFO-06-001; the subject was the administrative 
control of funds.  According to the document its purpose was “To provide Corporation 
staff with clear procedures to be followed in the execution of the budget and present basic 
fund control principles and concepts.”127  This document fixed financial responsibility 
and delineated who had the authority to determine grant levels and member service years.  
The positions of CEO, CFO, Deputy CFO for Planning and Program Management, 
Deputy CFO for Financial Management, COO, Executive Officers and the Director of 
Grants Management were all given specific and accountable responsibilities regarding the 
use of appropriated funds and Trust management.  The policy document also fixed Trust 
commitment supporting documentation and points of control with specific positions 
within the Corporation.  Each report and point of internal control was assigned to a 
specific position to ensure that the safeguards for ADA violations and member service 
year authorizations were not exceeded.   
As noted in the September 2004 Board of Directors minutes, the Corporation 
planned to use a logic model to link budget requests to strategic goals for fiscal year 
2006.  In 2006 the Corporation’s strategic plan that covered the period 2006-2011 was 
published.  It covered several areas of Corporation operations; however, only the area 
that focuses on management will be examined.  The management section, titled 
“Sustaining Excellence” emphasized effectiveness, accuracy, management alignment, 
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streamlining workloads and a targeted, in-depth monitoring and analysis of “…grantee 
programmatic and fiscal performance.”128  The strategic plan emphasized strict 
performance metric monitoring to allow real-time management decision making.  The 
Corporation intended to continue to invest in its information systems to better capture, 
aggregate and analyze data.  This investment was deemed essential to better integrate and 
streamline the budgeting and execution of Trust funds.  By gathering accurate, real-time 
data the Corporation believed that it could perform more effectively and efficiently.  This 
strategy also emphasized investment in human capital through sustained training and 
communication.  Through feedback loops and responsiveness the goals of the financial 
management and broader, overarching goals could be more readily implemented.  To 
sustain best practices, the Corporation aspired to become a successful learning 
organization by leveraging technology to share both knowledge and skill.129  As 
recommended by NAPA, the Corporation had incorporated planning and planning-related 
tools into its strategically significant issues related to the Trust and financial 
management.   
By the time the CEO presented his testimony in support of the fiscal year 2007 
President’s budget to the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and 
Human Services, Education and Related Agencies, the tone had significantly changed.  
This testimony consisted of measures of success; these measures dealt almost entirely 
with references to the number of volunteer hours and the work that was conducted to 
better the nation as a whole.  In the entire five page document there were only two 
paragraphs devoted to the management of the Corporation.  The first outlined the 
Corporation’s new strategic plan that covered the period 2006-2011.  The second covered 
the Corporation’s implementation of cost saving initiatives that were recommended as a 
part of the study conducted by NAPA.  There was no mention of Trust management, 
internal controls or management reforms. 
On June 27, 2007, the House Education and Labor Committee approved 
legislation to expand and improve several of the Corporation’s programs.  The 
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legislation, Generations Invigorating Volunteerism and Education Act (GIVE), H.R. 
2857, would increase the number of AmeriCorps volunteers from 75,000 to 100,000 by 
2012, increase member stipends by $400 by 2012, extend volunteer programs to middle 
and high school students and create an AmeriCorps reserve network focused on natural 
disaster response.  This legislation was largely the result of the Corporation building a 










IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CORPORATION’S CHANGES 
This chapter analyzes the change intervention styles and how the Corporation 
used them to make financial management transformation persist.  The sequencing, timing 
and rhythm of the change interventions is analyzed using Huy’s framework.  The chapter 
closes with an overview of the Corporation’s overall change process and its persistence 
and why starting with a commanding intervention appeared to be the best course of 
action. 
A. CHANGE INTERVENTION STYLES UTILIZED BY THE 
CORPORATION 
In Chapter II, Huy’s framework for effecting lasting planned organizational 
change was discussed.  Huy contends that planned organizational change is dependent on 
the juxtaposition of four differing change intervention styles and the timing, sequencing 
and pacing of the application of those styles.  The four intervention styles are: 
commanding, engineering, teaching and socializing.  The commanding intervention deals 
with authoritative power exerted on members of an organization from outside sources or 
from groups within an organization that have the ability to direct change.  The 
engineering intervention deals with changing processes and/or the organizational 
structure of an organization.  The teaching intervention is centered on changing 
employees’ beliefs to enact organizational change.  The socializing intervention is 
focused on changing social interactions to improve organizational effectiveness.130  
These change interventions must be timed and sequenced in such a way that the potential 
negative effects of one intervention are counteracted by the positive effects of another.  
The changes effected by the Corporation to address its financial management problems 
are analyzed through each of the four intervention styles. 
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1. Commanding Intervention 
Huy postulates that starting large scale change with the commanding intervention 
is effective if four key factors are met.131  The first factor is that the change agents’ 
power has to be concentrated.132  In the case of Congress, the change agent has the full 
weight of the law behind it; congress controls the authorization and appropriation process 
and literally has the power to end the program as a whole.  The President makes final 
budget decisions and is the head of the Executive Branch under which the Corporation 
falls.  The CEO of the Corporation is the most powerful figure within the organization 
and certainly has the power to direct large scale change.  After the problems with 
financial management were detected at the Corporation, language in SAPA directed the 
Board to have more authority, including the power to terminate the CEO, this gave the 
Board significant influence over reform efforts.  The second factor is that the 
organization has to accept hierarchical authority.133  The Corporation had been in 
existence for ten years at the time the change was initiated.  There is historical evidence 
that the Corporation’s employees did accept this type of authority; it can be seen in the 
tremendous efforts undertaken in 1999 to comply with the CFO Act to achieve a clean 
audit opinion in 2000.  The third factor is that the change has to have clear business 
logic.134  In the case of the financial management reform following the ADA violation, 
the Corporation’s employees understood that underlying financial management problems 
led to a serious breach of the law and diminished public trust.  To undertake efforts to 
correct this deficiency made clear business sense and that putting controls in place to 




                                                 
 





commanding intervention has to be followed with other intervention approaches to ensure 
that not only does the change persist, but that the organization is able to operate 
effectively in its new environment.135   
The commanding intervention associated with the financial management 
transformation at the Corporation came from three sources: Congress, the President and 
the Corporation’s Board of Directors and CEO.  Congress mandated change by passing 
the Strengthen AmeriCorps Program Act in July 2003.  The President’s signature one day 
after the law was passed clearly showed that the Executive Branch was also concerned 
with the management of the Trust and the Corporation.  SAPA is very closely related to 
Sarbanes-Oxley in that it not only requires improved financial management, it also  
requires the CEO to report on the condition of internal controls and is intended to ensure 
the accountability of public finds.  While Sarbanes-Oxley is concerned with shareholders, 
SAPA is concerned with taxpayers.  In February 2004, the President signed Executive 
Order 13331.  Among other things, this order charged the Corporation with adhering to 
management principles delineated in SAPA and it illustrated that both the Legislative and 
Executive branches were concerned with the financial health of the Corporation and felt 
that they needed to take action to ensure positive change.  The final commanding 
intervention involved directive recovery steps from the Board of Directos and several 
memorandums from the Corporation’s CEO to the entire organization.  The 
memorandums were intended to both socialize the nature of the problem and to highlight 
the need for change.  The formation of the Management Improvement Team was clearly 
a significant commanding intervention that resulted in lasting change within the 
Corporation and resulted in direction from the Board.   
2. Engineering Intervention 
The engineering intervention is likely to be effective when the change is directed 
at improving processes and economic performance.136  Although Huy describes this as a 
method for producing rapid change, in the case of the Corporation with millions of 
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volunteers, ten of thousands of supported customers and multiple financial reporting 
structures and systems, this change intervention was necessarily gradual.  The goal of the 
Corporation in improving its processes was to fix financial responsibility and at the same 
time to ensure that its accounting information systems produced timely, accurate and 
reliable data to make financial decisions.  The first step was to flatten the organizational 
structure to ensure that decisions could be made at the appropriate level.  This ensured 
that through delegation, the employees with the most accurate data and who were actively 
involved in processes had the authority to make decisions at their level.  The CFO staff 
was also reorganized to create an analysis and reporting team in the Office of the Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) responsible for developing an executive information system.  
This cross-functional approach is indicative of an organization establishing an enterprise 
approach to change.  This holistic approach ensured that there was consistency across 
segments and that the organization’s goals were integrated as a team effort.  Second, 
position descriptions were re-written to ensure that management of the Trust at each 
position was clearly defined.  The final step was to upgrade legacy accounting 
information systems.  This was initially done by requesting line item amounts in the 
President’s budget specifically marked for system upgrades.  The Corporation took an 
incremental approach that is still underway.  The first step was to link eSpan and WBRS 
into a single tool that ensured grantees could report, and the Corporation staff could see, 
on a real time basis the number of volunteers enrolled and the balance of the Trust.  The 
next step was to roll these systems into Momentum, the overarching data repository for 
the Corporation.  Subsequent events tied payroll, human resources and budget execution 
into Momentum.  Future plans include incorporating a performance metric dashboard and 
budgeting into Momentum,  but for now these are stand alone systems (the Corporation’s 
proposed financial management information system structure can be seen in Appendix G, 
source: Corporation’s PAR FY2004).  The Corporation also changed its process for the 
awarding of grants to increase competition and at the same time effectiveness and 
efficiency.  By tying grants amounts to performance metrics, the grantees had more 
control over how much money they would receive and the means to increase funding by 
performing at a higher level.  This change would have a systemic effect.  By increasing 
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competition, much like the competitive awarding of government contracts, the efficiency 
of grantees and the level of service that the Corporation as a whole could provide 
increased.   
3. Teaching Intervention 
The teaching intervention is likely to be successful when the desire is to change 
the employees’ beliefs and the purpose is to enhance the organization’s capabilities.137  
This change intervention generally is not rapid and the employee must be an active 
participant.  The change intervention is designed to change the entrenched beliefs that an 
employee holds to match the beliefs that an external source perceives.  After the 
Corporation received a clean audit opinion and had successfully enrolled more volunteers 
than in pervious periods, the perception was that they were on track and that the financial 
management of the Trust was performing well.  The ADA violation served as a shock to 
the system.  Subsequent reports by the Corporation’s IG, GAO and NAPA served to 
shake up the taken-for-granted financial management processes in the Corporation.  
There are numerous teaching interventions in the recovery of the Corporation, but the 
most germane to this thesis are the responses to the reports of the IG, GAO and NAPA.  
There is a tendency in the government to quickly list the deficiencies generated by an 
external audit, assign a responsible person and develop a plan of actions and milestones.  
This plan is usually acted on for a few months and then becomes less important as time 
goes on.  When it comes time for the next audit, the plan is taken out and a few weeks of 
effort are applied to correcting deficiencies.  This in turn does not lead to long-term 
change, the underlying problems still exist and the change is merely cosmetic. 
In the case of the Corporation, leadership felt that execution was more important 
than good intentions.  The Corporation took an active role in correcting and changing the 
cognitive perception of its employees.  The responses to the IG, GAO and NAPA reports 
typically indicated that the change had been made, not that a plan was in place to make 
the change.  To talk about plans in the future tense implies that no teaching has yet 
occurred, nor has the change been socialized thought the organization.  In chronological 
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order the IG report came first.  By the time the GAO finished its report, conditions that 
required change had been implemented.  After the GAO report, NAPA conducted a study 
and noted that the recommendations of GAO had been implemented.  In areas where 
change could not be made immediately, the Corporation took active steps to ensure that 
Congress and senior Corporation management understood the plan.  This was more than 
monitoring a plan of action and milestones, it included requesting supplemental or line 
item appropriations to upgrade information systems, active reports to Congress and the 
formation of a Management Improvement Team consisting of senior management to 
actively spread change through the Corporation.  There was continuity between what the 
employees were learning and what outside agencies required of them; this allowed the 
employees to make sense of why the old way was insufficient and why the new way was 
required.  While some of the changes made in response to the IG, GAO and NAPA 
reports were engineering in nature, the persistence of the changes were due to the 
teaching intervention and ensuring that employee beliefs were changed.  The Corporation 
was so successful in teaching new processes that grassroots efforts to improve business 
took place that helped to socialize the changes and ensure that they persisted. 
4. Socializing Intervention 
The socializing intervention is likely to be effective at changing social 
relationships and when the goal is to improve the organization’s effectiveness.138  The 
Corporation undertook several important initiatives to ensure that the strategic change 
required as a result of the ADA violation were socialized to the lowest levels.  The new 
CEO testified before congress that one of his main goals was to manage to accountability 
and for front line workers to have the ability to impact the strategic vision.  This 
empowerment of front line workers had an enormous impact on the quality and 
persistence of the change.  By allowing all employees to shape the nature of the change 
process, through direct interactions with the MIT, the employees were less likely to 
resent the commanding and teaching interventions that occurred both before and after the 
socializing change.  The Corporation viewed itself as a close community with many 
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shared beliefs and values.  Management was convinced that buy-in was a requirement to 
ensure that the change program persisted.  This was evident by investments in training 
systems that involved feedback loops and through continuous open communications.  The 
rapid dissemination of important, strategic information through the use of the 
Corporation’s intranet, newsroom and CEO press releases ensured that top level 
information made it down to the lowest echelons.  Enhanced employee awareness of the 
Corporation’s overarching goals allowed them the ability to shape their day-to-day efforts 
to support those goals.  By becoming a learning organization based on the sharing of 
knowledge, each employee not only understood the big picture, but could affect future 
outcomes.  One of major goals of the MIT included improving internal communications.  
This included mechanisms for employees to raise ideas for improving management, 
operations and communications and developing mechanisms to improve information 
sharing.  The Corporation created a collaboration intranet site that included a sharing staff 
idea portal, news on MIT and Corporation-wide management and organizational 
improvements portal and a portal that listed relevant studies and reports.139  This allowed 
actions that affected the entire Corporation to be widely disseminated down to the 
working level ensuring that needed information was not held up by bottlenecks at higher 
levels.  The final product that helped to socialize the vision of the Corporation was the 
strategic plan that covered 2006-2011.  This document affects all aspects of the 
Corporation and can be used by both managers and employees to guide the day to day 
business of the Corporation.   
All four intervention styles are evident in the changes that occurred at the 
Corporation after the 2002 ADA violation.  Like most other government agencies the 
Corporation had commanding interventions in the form of Congress, the President and 
senior management.  The Corporation also had complex accounting information systems 
that had to be upgraded and organizational structures that had to change through 
engineering interventions.  Additionally, the Corporation utilized the teaching and 
socializing interventions to counteract the potential negative impacts that can be felt in 
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organizations when major change is directed.  However, application of the four 
interventions styles themselves were not enough, there was a temporal aspect to change 
that was managed as well. 
B. TIMING, SEQUENCING AND RHYTHM OF INTERVENTION STYLES 
Huy proposes that the timing, sequencing and rhythm of the intervention styles 
play an integral role in determining the success or persistence of a transformation effort.  
We see that in the Corporation’s management reforms. 
Due to the nature of the ADA violation as a trigger, the change process at the 
Corporation inevitably began with a commanding intervention from Congress and the 
President.  The subsequent actions taken by the CEO and the Board of Directors to 
minimize the potentially negative effects of the commanding intervention were achieved 
through combining multiple intervention types and sequencing them such that negative 
effects of one style were offset by the positive effects of another.  The Corporation 
necessarily responded to commanding interventions by Congress and the President to 
ensure the Trust remained solvent.  This included directive changes within the 
Corporation and reengineering of accounting systems.  However, the Corporation quickly 
incorporated teaching interventions to ensure that the changes were understood and that 
the reorganized Corporation could operate effectively in its new environment.  
Concurrently, the MIT was ensuring buy-in by socializing the change to front-line 
workers by providing updates, soliciting feedback and by stressing personal interactions 
through web based knowledge sharing portals. 
To react to Congress and the President, the Corporation was required to take 
immediate action to prevent future Trust deficiencies.  This included putting policies and 
procedures in place, conducting initial evaluations on how to upgrade accounting 
information systems and drafting new funds control procedures for submission to OMB.  
While meeting these external requirements, several internal change processes were taking 
place simultaneously.  The Corporation was also responding to recommendations from 
the IG and GAO and trying to build its reputation with Congress.  Sensing that these 
simultaneous pressures could quickly lead to low morale and resentment, the MIT, by 
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February of 2004, had recommended that the Corporation institute training on new 
policies and procedures and employee information sharing programs.  These teaching and 
socializing interventions began shortly after and ran concurrently with the commanding 
changes that had been taking place since early 2003.  Examples of the teaching 
interventions that occurred concurrently with the commanding changes were: creation of 
online issues forums, development of an employee facilitator and trainer corps and 
ongoing training on key internal Corporation policies and operations.  The result of the 
teaching intervention was that employees were not overwhelmed with the new strategic 
focus of the organization because everyone understood the big picture.  Examples of 
socializing intervention that ran concurrently with the commanding intervention include: 
frequent newsletters and updates on issues such as MIT progress and recovery efforts, an 
upgraded intranet to spread information and incorporation of working level suggestions 
into the MIT’s recovery plan.  The socializing intervention helped to focus employee 
attitudes on recovery and progress, rather than on resenting management and the process 
of change itself.  This was accomplished by pushing information normally held at senior 
management levels down to employees at all levels and incorporating recommendations 
from those employees when appropriate.   
The engineering intervention that affected systems and processes, while a result of 
the commanding nature of SAPA language, occurred at a slower pace.  Prior to changing 
any business systems, the Corporation changed its organizational structure and assigned 
specific financial management responsibility to key positions and personnel.  It also 
designed internal control procedures that ensured compliance with federal fiscal law and 
submitted them to OMB.  Once the re-organization was in place, work could begin on 
changing the systems themselves.  Then extensive training on the new systems occurred 
at all levels of the Corporation, from headquarters to the grantee level.  This ensured that 
when a new system was brought online it could be used to gather timely, accurate and 




By combining systems and organizational engineering and teaching interventions, 
the Corporation was able to produce new accounting information systems that operated as 
advertised within a span of four years.  Future enhancements will only improve the 
system.   
Since sequencing can be viewed on a continuum of pure sequencing of one 
intervention at a time, or pure combining of all interventions at a time, it is important to 
recognize how the organization will react.  The Corporation effected positive change by 
falling in the middle of the continuum.  The early changes were nearly pure sequencing to 
ensure the solvency or the Trust and to guard against future ADA violations.  However, 
shortly after, most change interventions ran concurrently and were combined in such a 
way to reduce employee stress and garner buy-in from all levels of the organization. 
C. BEGINNING CHANGE WITH A COMMANDING INTERVENTION IN 
GOVERNMENT ENTITIES 
Due to the nature of government entities, change is usually driven from a group or 
groups that hold authoritative, commanding power.  As seen above, it is how the 
organization reacts to directives from Congress, the President or senior management that 
affects how those changes persist.  Change is often reversible and the path to change may 
be made under an assumption that there is only one correct sequence to maintain the 
persistence of that change.140  By understanding their organization, the Corporation was 
able to recognize that all four methods of intervention were needed and that they had to 
be sequenced in such a way to derive the maximum benefit of each to achieve lasting 
change.  The Corporation recognized that these intervention styles would also have to be 
juxtaposed and sequenced to derive the maximum benefit.  The styles were combined and 
sequenced in such a way that the potential negative side effects of each style were offset 
by the positive effects of another style.   
The changes in the Corporation produced a lasting, positive effect on the financial 
management of not only the Trust, but on the organization as a whole.  Since the 
Corporation faced many of the problems with financial management that the Navy faces 
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today, the process the Corporation used to make those changes persist should apply to the 
Navy.  Government agencies operate in an environment that is much different than that of 
private, for-profit corporations.  Government agencies face the pressures of influence by 
Congress and the President, are bound by fiscal law and government performance 
standards, and are bound by appropriations made by Congress rather than by generating 
equity in their organization.  The adoption of best practices from private industry in this 
environment may not produce the lasting change that government agencies desire.  The 
Corporation effected positive change and the process has all of the hallmarks seen in 
Huy’s model.  Specifically, beginning planned change with the commanding intervention 
style and supplementing with the other intervention styles sequenced such that the 
organization thrives in its new environment. 
The Navy, while much larger in scope than the Corporation, has its own change 
agenda that spans beyond fiscal year 2015.  The longer timeline is indicative of the 
difference in size and scope between the Corporation and the Navy.  This thesis does not 
question the timeline of the Navy’s proposed transformation effort, but rather is 
concerned with how to make those changes persist.  The next chapter discusses the 
Navy’s business transformation overview outlined in the DoD’s September 2007 
Enterprise Transition Plan.  Lessons from the Corporation’s experiences and Huy’s 




















V. LESSONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT COMMUNITY 
This chapter gives a brief overview of the Navy’s business transformation plan as 
outlined by the September 2007 DoD Enterprise Transition Plan.  Then this plan is 
analyzed using Huy’s framework.  The chapter is broken down by the four change 
intervention styles and a section on the timing, sequencing and pacing of the Navy’s 
planned change.  This analysis parallels that of the Corporation’s change strategy 
generating recommendations for the Navy. 
There have been numerous business transformation efforts in the Navy spanning 
decades.  These efforts include Total Quality Leadership (TQL), Total Quality 
Management (TQM) and more recently Lean Six Sigma.  The Navy’s goal in business 
transformation is to free resources for reinvestment in improved war fighting capabilities.  
The method of freeing those resources is by becoming a more effective and efficient 
enterprise by implementing innovative business practices.141  The balance between 
funding future capabilities while simultaneously maintaining current capabilities to meet 
mission requirements has proven to be a challenge for the Navy.  The Navy has adopted a 
business transformation strategy designed to support both of these goals.  This strategy 
includes process changes and process improvements.  The Navy’s number one business 
priority is to “identify and protect the resources required to sustain our naval forces’ core 
capabilities.”142  To achieve this goal the Navy intends to cut overhead costs, streamline 
processes, enable a net-centric environment, increase oversight of procurement and 
contracting, cut non-value added activities and create incentives for DON warfighters and 
civilian employees to become agents of change.143  The DON has listed five priorities to 
support its transformation efforts: 
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1.  Create a Seamless Infrastructure 
2.  Create Optimized Processes and Integrated Systems 
3.  Optimize Investments for Mission Accomplishment 
4.  Transform Applications and Data into Web-based Capabilities to 
Improve Effectiveness and Gain Efficiencies 
5.  Align Business Mission Area Governance to Further Transformation     
Goals.144 
There have been programs implemented ostensibly to support these priorities including: 
Navy/Marine Corps Intranet, pilot studies for a Navy ERP system, Lean Six Sigma 
projects, enterprise-wide black-belt training, and several planned upgrades to legacy 
information systems that span a period of ten years.  Using Huy’s framework, the Navy’s 
plan for transformation is discussed below. 
A. THE NAVY’S COMMANDING INTERVENTION 
The Navy’s environment supporting a commanding intervention closely parallels 
that faced by the Corporation.  Both face external pressures to reform from Congress, the 
President and the American people and follow a chain-of-command that starts with the 
President.  Both agencies are required to comply with congressional laws that affect all 
government agencies such as the CFO Act and GPRA.  In fact, if the commanding 
intervention is used in a military setting, the response would expectedly be more positive 
than in any other government agency.  Military personnel are used to complying with 
exacting orders and carrying them out. 
According to Huy, the application of the commanding intervention involves “a 
commander-like approach whereby change agents apply directive and coercive actions to 
their change targets to exact compliance with their proposed change goals.”145  This type 
of approach in the Navy is widely evidenced in such programs as TQL, TQM, Sea Power 
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21, Navy ERP and Lean Six Sigma projects; all processes directed by senior leadership.  
These types of programs typify the construct of the commanding intervention which, 
“follows the approaches taken in formal strategic planning involving examination of the 
internal and external situations, applying analytical frameworks to make changes in 
tangible entities such as introducing formal structures, divestment of people, assets and 
systems.”146  While engineering in nature, programs such as TQL, TQM and Lean Six 
Sigma were pushed down to the operational level in response to outside pressures for the 
department to reform its business practices.  The measure of success of these programs 
was to be nearly instantaneous cost savings or cost avoidance.  The outcome of changes 
directed by Navy leadership for these efforts was expected to be measured in clock time, 
by personnel at all levels of the organization.  TQL and TQM had success in the private 
sector but, when commanded from senior levels of the DoD and DON, received 
lukewarm acceptance and likewise mediocre results in the Navy.  As far back as 1994, 
the GAO noted that, “Most inventory management personnel are not receiving the 
training they need to effect cultural change…Further, less than 30 percent of military 
inventory management personnel are even required to take training…”147  The phrases 
TQM and TQL and virtually non-existent in today’s Navy lexicon.  The underlying 
science that created positive results in other organizations did not apply directly to the 
organization of the DoD or the DON.  It was not inherently flawed, but was something 
that would not succeed unless leadership stood behind it 100 percent and lower levels 
bought in to the changes directed from above.   
Huy states that the commanding change only belongs to a small cadre of people, 
usually those with the most power in the organization.148  In the case of the Navy this 
group is also aided by a group of management consultants, who in many cases are seen as 
outsiders with little knowledge of the Navy.  Business transformation decisions made by 
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senior leadership were not necessarily flawed; it may have been that the execution of the 
plan did not occur in such a way that ensured lasting change.  Leaders can direct change, 
but if it appears that the change itself is the result of a study or a plan conceived by a paid 
consultant, the level of buy-in at lower echelons may be tempered by anything less than 
full support by leadership.  Commands from senior Navy leaders only reach so far down 
the organization before they need to be supplemented with another intervention.  
Successful planned change does not involve updating plans, but rather incorporating 
change into the daily business efforts of the organization.  According to Euske, the 
commanding intervention can achieve fast and visible changes, such that a manager can 
update a plan of action and milestones, but that it is improbable that the commanding 
intervention will actually change beliefs and result in lasting change.149   
B. THE NAVY’S ENGINEERING INTERVENTION 
The Navy’s business transformation plan is focused on reengineering processes to 
increase effectiveness and gain efficiencies.  The Navy’s plan appears sound and has 
proven that reengineering efforts can yield savings.  However, those savings are small 
and it is not clear whether those savings are being used in the way that the CNO 
envisioned.  For example, “…there is a significant disparity between FMB’s savings 
estimates and those of the Echelon II Commanders/Resource Sponsors.  Specifically, 
FMB recognizes $898 million in ‘identified’ savings across they FYDP, while SE BOD 
estimates $27.7 billion”150   Further, “’Savings’ are being tracked and reported by several 
different entities throughout the DON.”151  Actual realized and harvested savings for 
recapitalization were significantly less than estimated by Sea Enterprise.152  It is also 
important to recognize that past reengineering efforts such as TQM did not yield the 
results that the Navy desired.  Through Huy’s framework some generalized lessons can 
be applied. 
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Several engineering interventions are currently taking place within DoD and the 
Navy.  The BTA publishes a Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA) summary on an 
annual basis.  The BEA is the architecture that supports the DoD business mission area 
and there are six business enterprise priorities, one of which is financial visibility.  Part of 
the engineering solution for financial visibility is the Standard Financial Information 
Structure (SFIS).  This structure provides a common financial information system for all 
DoD components and agencies.  This information will then be aggregated at the DoD 
level and provide CFO Act compliant data for the entire enterprise.  Implementation of 
SFIS is taking an enterprise-wide approach, “The BTA’s implementation experts on the 
Enterprise Integration team are working closely with all major ERP programs to ensure 
that standard implementation and configuration are achieved across the DoD.”153  The 
Navy’s ERP implementation is scheduled for 2013. 
By September 2005, the Navy had invested approximately $1 billion in four ERP 
pilots.  These pilots were not intended to be enterprise-wide business solutions.154  GAO 
stated, “…because of the various inconsistencies in the design and implementation of the 
pilots, they were not interoperable, even though they performed many of the same 
business functions.”155  According to Huy, engineering interventions, like pilot studies, 
can lead to stove-piped organizations and create parochialism at the expense of 
enterprise-wide integration and cooperation.156  The lack of success of the four initial 
pilots caused the Navy to create an ERP central program office to manage the 
implementation.  GAO has found that unlike other similar projects within DoD, the 
central program office appears to be using an effective process of identifying and 
documenting requirements.157  The current ERP implementation schedule has slipped 
from 2011 to 2013 in the past two years.  A twelve year implementation schedule and 
$1.8 billion to date (for pilot projects alone) are being used to ensure that this program 
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takes hold.  Making the system perform as designed is not enough: “pilot site 
experiments rarely spread, for their very success generates defensiveness and rejection by 
other business units claiming that they are different.”158  Due to the differing nature of 
the various Navy enterprises (undersea, aviation, surface, net-warfare) successful 
implementation at one enterprise may not translate to successful ERP systems at another.  
Aviation depots differ significantly from shipyards and net-warfare support is different 
from all of the other stakeholders.  If buy-in is not obtained from other segments of the 
enterprise up front, later successes are in jeopardy.  This thesis does not question the 
systems that the Navy is developing to support SFIS and ERP, but questions whether 
efforts are being taken to generate buy-in across the enterprise (horizontal) and down the 
chain of command (vertical) and whether the engineering changes are sufficiently 
integrated with the commanding, teaching and socializing interventions.  This will be 
necessary to ensure lasting change.   
The Navy has also instituted an engineering change intervention to its 
organizational structure.  Navy Enterprise (NE) is designed to eliminate the stove-piped 
nature of the major subordinate commands by creating a matrix structure that aligns 
supported and supporting commands vertically and horizontally.  Though the process is 
still in its early stages, the desired end result is an improvement on the legacy 
organization by creating an organization that takes the entire enterprise into account when 
making decisions.  The vision is stove-pipes broken down and major commands sharing 
information and decision making.  Success in this area requires that all major commands 
recognize the enterprise as a whole or they may regress back to legacy stove-piped, 
autonomous organizations.  Reorganization is a highly stressful event and leaders must 
recognize that the process itself can fail due to employee perception of the process and 
the stress of change.  Kahn, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthal (as quoted in Huy) state, 
Imposed change in the formal structures (e.g., matrix) had caused at least 
three kinds of time-related stress: role ambiguity, such that some 
employees did not know when to play a specific role; role conflict, such 
that they did not know which of the competing role behaviors to perform 
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at a specific time; and role overload, such that employees had to perform 
more role behaviors than was possible in a given time period.159  
The Navy tends to default to reengineering processes and structures.  There are 
plans to reengineer systems to meet the standards of SFIS, Lean Six Sigma projects to 
generate cost savings and cost avoidance, and the Navy Enterprise matrix organization.  
Just as commanding interventions are not successful alone, engineering interventions 
need to be supplemented with other interventions. 
C. THE NAVY’S TEACHING INTERVENTION 
The Navy has an established general military training program, professional 
development programs and an array of service schools to train and educate personnel, but 
there are few examples of what Huy describes as teaching.  Huy states that “outside 
intervention is necessary to convert the tacit causes of ineffectiveness into explicit 
formulations, since employees are cognitively trapped by their own hidden 
assumptions.”160  Facing these underlying tacit causes takes more than training; it 
involves changing the cognitive beliefs of employees.  This requires collaboration 
between the change agent and the employee rather than training on how to complete a 
task.  Teaching is likely to be effective when the goal, like the Navy’s business 
transformation goal, is to develop capabilities.  However, this effort is typically effective 
only when beliefs are changed.161  As opposed to the commanding intervention, where 
personnel can feel resentment at the change imposed on them, in the teaching 
intervention, personnel are actively involved in their reeducation.162  In one positive 
example the Navy has made extensive progress in training Lean Six Sigma green and 
black belts to get to the root of process problems and actively involve some employees at 
the lowest levels.  As of 2006, “Several Deputy Assistant Secretaries of the Navy 
(DASNs) have completed GB training, and the DON’s total of 3,399 trained LSS GBs 
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exceeds the Secretary’s goal of 2,000 by the end of 2006.  Over 4,400 leaders have 
completed LSS Champion training, including 92% of the Secretary’s direct reports.  Of 
the 935 trained LSS Black Belts (BB) in the Department, 93 have attained American 
Society for Quality (ASQ) BB certification.”163 
Overall, however, the Navy’s business transformation does not seem to have the 
same teaching effort to back up the commanding and engineering interventions.  
Congressional, Presidential and GAO pressures resulted in programs such as the BTA, 
the Navy’s Financial Improvement Plan (FIP), Navy ERP, and many engineering changes 
described above.  Yet, the effort to teach these proposed changes to the managers of these 
futures systems seems lacking.  Changing the culture in the DoD was first mentioned in 
the September 2007 ETP.  Recognizing that changing people’s attitudes and skills as well 
as the organizational dynamic is an important first step, it recognizes the teaching and 
socializing aspects of planned change.  However, there was no specific plan outlined to 
accomplish this goal.  If neglected, there may be a general feeling that these change 
programs may fade with a change in administration or may fail like past change efforts.  
To ensure that the change persists, the Navy needs to ensure that the managers who will 
inherit the system in 10 years collaborate in effecting the business transformation.   
The final teaching intervention is how the Navy reacts to outside reports and takes 
corrective actions.  While some of the responses may be engineering in nature if a whole 
system or process is changed, the persistence of making those changes gets to the root of 
the teaching intervention.  Huy states that, “change actions are primarily entrained to 
pacers that are outside the organization—external agents’ active diagnosis based on their 
theory of organizational ineffectiveness.”164  There are many instances where an outside 
activity makes a diagnosis of the Navy: GAO reports, DoD studies, Naval Audit Service 
investigations, and a major command shipboard inspection.  When a report or 
investigation is complete a list of deficiencies is generated.  Success on the next 
inspection has traditionally been based on correction of past deficiencies.  But correction 
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may not lead to learning.  The Navy needs to become a learning organization.  While 
easier said than done, an effort to get to the root of a problem rather than making a 
cosmetic change is important.  Outside agencies can see problems that insiders cannot 
see.  Changing the beliefs of an employee is hard to do.  But by getting an employee to 
become an active participant in the change process, which is different than commanding 
them to change, will make changes persist.  The Navy’s business transformation is very 
similar.  The Navy is reacting to outside pressures and many financial managers may not 
see a need for change.  If only the commanding and engineering interventions are used, 
the changes may not last beyond a change in command or administration.  The teaching 
intervention can cope with this problem by showing employees the broader picture.  
Understanding how to use new information systems is much different than understanding 
why new systems are being adopted.  If the change makes business sense, and the Navy’s 
business transformation does, then buy-in is established and the potential negative effects 
of the commanding and engineering interventions are counteracted.165 
A potential side effect to the teaching interventions is that “cognitive change does 
not always lead to sustained behavioral change.”166  The teaching intervention can be 
supplemented with the socializing intervention. 
D. THE NAVY’S SOCIALIZING INTERVENTION 
Socializing efforts in the Navy typically revolve around indoctrination.  
Socializing in the Navy focuses on culture shifting, adopting a common vocabulary and 
working as a war fighting team.  The change from civilian to uniformed service member 
through Officer Candidate School or Boot Camp is typical of how the Navy views 
socialization.  Where the teaching method believes that changes in beliefs lead to changes 
in behavior, the socializing method believes that changes in personal interactions lead to 
changes in beliefs and organizational culture.167  The two interventions reinforce one 
another.  Social relationships across all levels of an organization are important because 
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they create a feeling of continuity and reassure the employee during the apparent chaos of 
change.  The phasing of the social intervention is gradual as it involves change that is not 
related to a commanding or engineering intervention.   
This is one area that a military organization finds difficult to implement.  Due to 
restrictions on fraternization and tiered rank structures, the socializing effort can be hard 
to maintain.  In the case of the Navy’s business transformation effort, this socialization is 
paramount.  If the change plan does not trickle down to the lowest level financial 
manager, or the lowest level of operational command, there is very little hope for buy-in.  
The plan itself will be viewed as another idea formulated in the Pentagon that has very 
little bearing on the day to day business practices in the fleet.  If reward structures do not 
change, there will be little buy-in.  According to Huy, “change agents using the 
socializing approach are often self-motivated employees who are distributed throughout 
all levels of the organization.”168  These employees have 1) bought into the need for 
change and 2) desire to create the necessary organizational synergy to create the 
change.169  Yet, there needs to be supporting structures to create the impetus for creating 
enterprise-wide buy-in.  This type of change intervention can be seen in grassroots efforts 
across any Navy command; however, they are typically evidenced in easy to understand 
processes such as engineering or aviation.  Motivated senior enlisted personnel have 
created outstanding change efforts by leading by example and motivating their personnel; 
this is harder to accomplish in transformation.  If the Navy’s transformation efforts are to 
succeed, the department as a whole will have to socialize the change plan down to the 
lowest levels.  When motivated managers and front-line personnel buy into the program, 
the effects are likely to help the changes persist.  The changes will then occur through the 
process of personal, open and imaginative conversations between the change agents and 
other personnel.   
TQM, TQL and Lean Six Sigma have not had wide-spread buy-in due to 
insufficient socialization.  All are programs that were pushed down from leadership in an 
effort to make the Navy more business-like.  TQM and TQL produced marginal results 
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and were never widely accepted.  Lean Six Sigma is the current management tool that has 
been adopted by the Navy, yet with the exception of isolated communities, acceptance 
and application appears lacking.  Lean Six Sigma, while providing positive benefits for 
the Naval Aviation Systems Command, is much like other pilot projects.  According to 
Apte and Kang, “The early results are very promising.  As the Lean Six Sigma mindset 
continues to grow among the DoD community and both the Lean and Six Sigma practices 
become more commonplace, the equipment and personnel available to the DoD will 
provide considerable more capability…”170  Although promising, adoption by all of the 
Navy enterprises is necessary.  Nothing is driving incorporation into daily practice other 
than a command from leadership.   
There are not many programs in the Navy that closely parallel the effective 
socializing efforts seen in the Corporation.  The Navy has created Navy Knowledge 
online, a portal for sailors to get information and share ideas.  This includes community 
specific information and information on Navy-wide activities.  However, it contains little 
information on business transformation efforts.  Information can also be found on the 
BTA and Navy websites, but many of the documents number in the hundreds of pages 
and may be difficult for everybody to access.  To date most information on Navy 
transformation efforts has been distributed through All Navy messages.  While this effort 
may help to get key transformation phrases into the vocabulary, it does not socialize the 
change process, nor does it generate buy-in.  If the goal of transformation is to develop an 
organization’s capabilities, the social structure of relationships also needs to be 
addressed.  This relationship can be on an individual basis or on an organizational level.  
How BTA, ETP, ERP and the new organizational structures imposed by Navy Enterprise 
affect how the Navy conducts business (now and in the future) needs to be incorporated 
into the daily lives of everybody.  Those charged with driving the Navy’s transformation 
efforts need to address how these changes will be socialized so that they are actually 
incorporated into daily practices.   
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Historically many in the Navy have desired to get the most money for their 
command possible and to spend it quickly.  Engineering interventions such as Lean Six 
Sigma projects that are designed to harvest savings by creating more efficient and 
effective processes will not work if the mindset of the Navy is not changed.  A socialized 
framework of efficient and effective operations needs to spread across the enterprise, not 
just to areas selected for a Lean Six Sigma project.  It needs to become the norm, or true 
transformation cannot occur.   
Tracking progress of the FIAR plan has similarly not been socialized across the 
enterprise.  Progress is tracked by checking completion of specified tasks against a plan 
of action and milestones, not by how the organization as a whole is making progress 
towards producing clean financial statements.171  By only tracking completion of a plan, 
there is no change in the beliefs of personnel or of the lower level commands as a whole, 
it is seen as something that only affects people sitting in the Pentagon.   
There is a beneficial suggestion program for cost-savings initiatives, but there is 
not a corresponding program for good management.172  There are similar programs for 
civilian personnel; these programs are managed by the local Human Resources Office.  
This creates an incentive for people and commands to create change, to become more 
effective and efficient.  There is not a similar program for commands that receive clean 
audits on their portion of the financial statements.  There are no negatives for failing an 
audit and no rewards for a clean opinion.  The supporting structures do not match the 
change agenda. 
The socializing intervention is a major key to success and persistence of the 
Navy’s business transformation that seems to have been taken for granted at this point in 
the implementation process.  The commanding and engineering interventions are what is 
driving the effort, but without adding the other two forms of change intervention there 
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will likely be little buy in from those who will manage the system in the future  
or those currently using the legacy systems. 
E. TIMING, SEQUENCING AND PACING THE NAVY’S CHANGES 
Starting large-scale change with the commanding intervention has proven 
successful in another government entity.  The change efforts in the Navy also started with 
the commanding intervention in the form of pressures from Congress, the President and 
DoD.  The resulting change efforts have been widely focused on reengineering processes 
and systems.  There is no mention how these changes will be supplemented by teaching 
or socializing in the Navy’s business transformation plan or any transformation document 
found in this research. 
The Navy’s current business transformation has been underway since 2002.  
Although many programs have been implemented to produce incremental results, there 
was not an overarching trigger that created a great sense of urgency for change.  Since a 
great imperative for change does not exist department-wide, the Navy needs to use 
teaching and socializing change interventions to ensure that the proposed changes persist.  
The Corporation had such a trigger, the 2002 ADA violation.  Therefore the teaching and 
socializing interventions are more important for the Navy than they were for the 
Corporation.  This thesis does not propose that the lack of such programs at this point in 
the process has doomed the effort to failure.  Due to the complexities of the Navy and the 
timeline for accounting information system upgrades, there is time to create the right 
environment for change to flourish.   
In the case of the Navy Enterprise organizational reengineering, buy-in is 
required.  It is necessary that this change in organizational structure be taught and 
socialized to the operational level and that feedback on its implementation process be 
sought from all personnel.  If the matrix is forced on the existing structure, there will be 
push back that could derail the entire process 
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VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Corporation is not as large as DoD or DON, but as noted earlier, the 
Corporation did face many similar financial management problems and has since 
recovered.  The Corporation staff includes both headquarters in Washington, D.C. and in 
local offices located in each of the 50 states and territories.  In fiscal year 2007 the 
Corporation had budget authority of nearly $950,000,000 and supported a workforce of 
volunteers totaling 3,800,000 across all of its programs, though this represents more 
budgeting and payroll activities than management.  The Corporation supports over 
70,000 non-profit organizations.  While not as extensive as DoD or DON, it can be 
argued that because it is smaller in size, the business management transformation in the 
Corporation that took place from 2002 to 2006 can be more easily analyzed.  While there 
may not be a direct correlation in size and scope between the two entities, the change 
process itself can be applied to the Navy, the time scale is necessarily adjusted in the case 
of Navy due to larger size and complexity.  But the basic principles of change 
intervention styles and the timing, sequencing and rhythm of those interventions can be 
applied. 
Through the experiences of the Corporation, an entity that faced many similar 
financial management problems faced by the Navy and recovered, it can be generalized 
that the processes used to implement that change could work in the Navy.  Each 
intervention style posed in Huy’s framework can also be seen in the change process at the 
Corporation as can the timing, sequencing and pacing of those changes.  Due to the 
nature of government agencies, most changes are driven by external factors and groups 
that wield coercive power over those agencies, necessitating beginning with a 
commanding change.  This supports Huy’s framework for planned change in the case of 
the Corporation and it can be generalized that it applies to other government agencies.   
A. FINDINGS 
The research questions this thesis attempted to answer were: (a) what were the 
financial management, budget and internal control problems that led to the Corporation’s 
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ADA violation and program disruption; (b) what financial management, budget and 
internal control changes were implemented by the Corporation to correct those problems; 
(c) what was it about these changes that made them persist; (d) how can these changes be 
applied to the Navy financial management community to generate similar positive 
effects? 
The Corporation faced many similar problems in financial management, 
budgeting and internal controls that the Navy faces today.  Frequent management 
turnover tied to administration changes, accounting information systems that are not 
interlinked and did not provide accurate and timely information for decision makers, 
internal and management controls that were not effectively formulated, implemented or 
monitored and a widely dispersed group of field activities in the form of grantees.  The 
Corporation used all four of Huy’s intervention styles to correct these problems.  
Congress and the President demanded management reforms that were implemented and 
reported back to Congress.  Accounting systems were reengineered to provide accurate, 
timely and reliable information that was useful to decision makers with more upgrades to 
come.  The IG, GAO and NAPA provided useful recommendations for process 
improvements that were used as teaching aids that changed the beliefs of workers thus 
creating lasting change.  Finally, the change plan was widely socialized throughout the 
organization ensuring buy-in from management to front-line workers.  By sequencing the 
intervention styles to offset potential negative effects of one by supplementing with 
another and pacing them such that workers were not overwhelmed, the process was not 
viewed as the enemy, nor was management.    
Congress and the President have commanded that the DoD and the Navy 
transform its business practices.  The Navy has the ability to enact a commanding 
intervention and is good at doing so.  The Navy, by its very nature, is responsive to 
commanding interventions and has responded to the external pressures exerted on it by 
creating a business transformation plan.  The Navy also tends to adopt reengineering 




Sigma.  However, while the Navy may be good at training, it should focus more on 
teaching and socializing its business transformation effort to ensure that the changes are 
understood, embraced and persist.   
The Corporation was also successful in dealing with Congress as it transformed 
its business practices.  By notifying Congress ahead of major events, good or bad, the 
Corporation was able to generate goodwill and reverse a previously adversarial working 
relationship.  Several of the business transformation reports required of the Navy by 
Congress are semi-annual or annual.  Differences in perspective between Congress and 
the Navy, institutional conflict between the legislative and executive branches, and 
differing reporting requirements between Congress and OMB can lead to cynicism for all 
parties involved.173  The efforts of the Corporation to keep stakeholders apprised of all 
recovery efforts through frequent and direct communication allowed them to focus on 
real change rather than a combative relationship with Congress.  If the Navy were to be 
more up front with Congress on an informal basis, the Navy too may generate goodwill. 
Changing organizational structures and processes necessarily cause stress at the 
operational level.  Many front-line employees to mid-level managers do not understand 
the business transformation plan and this causes stress and resistance.  The most 
important thing that a leader can do to maximize performance is to, “…creatively, 
aggressively, and systematically build the capabilities of the company’s middle 
management team…”174  If the capabilities of middle management are not developed, 
they can become the “Frozen Middle.”175  If this occurs, any idea or change initiative that 
leadership desires, middle management would be unwilling or unable to carry out.176  To 
counteract this side effect the Navy should treat business transformation education and 
socialization with the same vigor that is applied to joint education.  If there is a concern at 
                                                 
173 Beryl A. Radin, Challenging the Performance Movement: Accountability Complexity and 
Democratic Values, Georgetown University Press: Washington D.C., 2006. 
174 Jonathon L. S. Byrnes, “Middle Management Excellence,” Harvard Business School: Working 
Knowledge for Business Leaders, available from www.hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/5126.html, accessed, 
October 31, 2007, 1. 
175 Ibid, 1. 
176 Ibid. 
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any level that the transformation plan is a fad or will become obsolete with a change in 
administration, then the plan itself has less of a chance to succeed.  Leadership needs to 
stand behind its plan and get buy-in from every level of the Navy.  Communication of the 
Navy’s plan seems like it has hit a bottleneck and has not filtered down to those who will 
be charged with implementing and managing the new systems once they come on line.   
The one aspect of the commanding intervention that differs significantly between 
the Corporation and the Navy is a sense of urgency at all levels.  Kotter states that well 
over 50 percent of all change efforts fail in this first phase because senior leadership often 
fails to recognize how difficult it is to drive people out of their comfort zones.177  The 
Corporation experienced a singular, defining event that triggered their transformation 
efforts, the 2002 ADA violation.  This event had the potential to completely end the 
program, and it almost did.  If not for the efforts of a handful of members of Congress 
and the President, the Corporation may not have been reauthorized.  The Navy is 
expected to exist by the Constitution; the chances of shoddy financial management 
affecting the very existence of the Navy are slim.  However, there may be financial 
triggers in the near future that will create this sense of urgency at the lowest levels of the 
Navy.  Increasing mandatory spending, returning to baseline budgeting versus 
supplemental appropriations, rising personnel costs and the need to replace the existing 
inventory of ships and aircraft with more expensive future systems all may decrease the 
Navy’s portion of the President’s budget while it becomes more costly to operate.  With 
this potential crisis looming, the leadership will need to establish this sense of urgency 
linked to its commanding intervention.  Other change intervention styles may aid in this 
process. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
For the Navy’s business transformation effort to be successful, significant 
teaching and socializing interventions need to be incorporated and sequenced such that 
there is buy in at all levels of the organization before a major change occurs or system is 
brought online.    
                                                 
177 Kotter, 2007. 
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Recommendations for teaching interventions include the following:  
1. Creating a general military training module that is focused on the broad aspects of the 
business transformation plan. 
2. Creating a mandatory education program similar in scope to joint professional military 
education tailored towards business transformation for both military and civilian Navy 
financial managers. 
3.  Creating a mobile training team that teaches and solicits feedback. 
4.  Creating a working environment that is more concerned with learning than merely 
correcting deficiencies to change beliefs instead of inspection scores.  This requires 
continuous improvement rather than cosmetic improvements to pass an inspection.   
The teaching intervention requires a commitment up front to ensure future 
success.  As seen in the Corporation, front-line workers were actively involved in the 
change process and had contact with the change agents (the MIT).  Everyone at the 
Corporation also understood the transformation goals and timelines through regular 
newsletters and intranet sites.  Similar methods could be effective in the Navy.  The 
current effort seems focused on Flag and Captain level officers through executive 
education.  Making education available to mid-level officers through required 
professional education or through General Military Training, with current progress 
updates could generate positive feedback loops that will help make the proposed changes 
persist.  The same type of program could be applied to civil-service civilian employees.  
If it is a DoD-wide goal to transform business practices to better support the war fighter, 
just as it is to create an interoperable joint force, then equal weight should be given to 
business transformation as is to joint education.  The Navy could also create a mobile 
training team of business transformation efforts to actively reach out to commands 
through town hall style forums to sell the plan and solicit feedback.  The goal of these 
forums being to break the tacit, shared assumptions that are likely to derail the change 
process.  From the perspective of a mid-level officer, the current plan is too complex to 
understand and too ambiguous for them to cause any positive effect.   
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Recommendations for the socializing interventions include the following:  
1.  Creating a cadre of embedded financial management transformation experts that 
create synergy at the operational level and above by generating buy-in for the change 
process. 
2.  Establishing a collaboration portal on the Navy Knowledge Online website to answer 
questions and concerns and solicit feedback.  
3.  Utilizing really simple syndication (RSS) feeds and desktop transformation dashboard 
widgets that provide news and updates,  
4.  Creating an enterprise-wide cross-functional working group to ensure that 
transformation efforts are not stove-piped.  
4.  Changing reward and incentive structures.   
Through tools like those described above, the Navy could get the message of 
transformation out to the entire enterprise.  These tools could help socialize the change 
effort and use technology to leverage the effort.  To put the plan on the desktop of a 
person’s computer, rather than making him/her search for the information on many 
disparate web sites, should help get information out into the enterprise.   
While it may seem that the socializing change is out of the hands of senior 
leadership, that is not the case.  The socializing intervention supports and supplements 
the other intervention styles.  The Navy could, in conjunction with town hall forums, 
solicit volunteers to learn more about the process, much like black and green belts are 
trained in the engineering interventions.  This team of business transformation experts 
could then go back to their commands and guide the change process at the lowest levels.  
This will provide all personnel the opportunity to determine that the change is not short-
term and opportunistic, but rather something that will improve their quality of life and the 
quality of the organization.  Another method seen in the Corporation was to create arenas 
for management and employees to collaborate on the change process and for front-line 
workers to provide instantaneous feedback.  This could be achieved in the Navy by 
adding a monitored portal on the Navy Knowledge Online website, allowing personnel to 
post comments, questions and suggestions and having a subject matter expert provide a 
timely response.  Creating enterprise-wide town-hall meeting with senior officials and 
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publishing a transformation newsletter similar to “Rhumb Lines” would help to socialize 
the Navy’s agenda.  Another solution could be to create cross-functional and cross-
command working groups to share information horizontally across the enterprise.  If 
change efforts are being tracked only by crossing off goals on a plan of actions and 
milestones, the end result will be that only one office knows the whole picture.  The 
horizontal integration desired by Navy Enterprise will not occur as organizations will not 
collaborate to achieve enterprise-wide goals. 
By combining the teaching and socializing interventions recommended above and 
sequencing them such that they occur before major systems are brought online or future 
re-organizations occur it is more likely that the changes will be well received at all levels.  
It is not enough to build accounting information systems that move information.  
Managers need to know how to use that information, decision processes should also 
change.  As the capabilities then become known, demand for information will increase, 
reinforcing the engineering changes.   
An education program for mid-level managers should be established quickly to 
ensure that there is time to exploit the reengineering efforts.  Concurrently, a mobile 
training team should be created to spread the word about Navy business transformation 
and create an imperative for change.  The Navy has a plan in place that resolves many of 
the technical business system problems faced by financial managers, but needs to ensure 
that the social problems are also addressed.  That is, ensure that the organization is ready 
and accepting.  The time for abrupt changes has passed; it is time for the Navy to solidify 
its transformation effort with teaching and socializing interventions that will span the life 
of the engineering changes. 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
One limitation of this thesis was that it used the case method with only one source 
of data.  By examining other government agencies that have effected positive change 
using Huy’s model it will further validate the framework and possibly provide further 
insights into what makes change persist in government entities.  Due to time limitations, 
this thesis did not attempt to conduct a survey on Naval personnel to determine how 
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socialized the business transformation effort is, the position that it is not well socialized is 
based on informal conversations will financial management students at the Naval 
Postgraduate School and feedback from advisors who routinely work with the Navy’s 
business managers.  Understanding how well the business transformation effort has 
actually been socialized will help decision-makers develop a plan to teach and socialize 
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